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RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR LAW - UNION REPRESENTING SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES IS A
"LABOR ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING EMPLOYEES" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF SECTION 301 (A) OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT. - A col-
lective bargaining agreement between the Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., and District 2,
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO, contained an arbitration
clause. The agreement resulted from negotiations between the employer and
union, which represented the employer's supervisory employees. On March 7,
1966, the union petitioned the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, to
compel arbitration of a dispute which arose out of the sale by the employer of
certain vessels. On March 18, 1966, the employer petitioned the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York for removal of the suit from
the state court on the ground that the district court had original jurisdiction
under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.1 After
removal, the union moved to remand to the state court asserting that the federal
district court lacked jurisdiction. The union alleged that it was not a "labor
organization representing employees" within the meaning of section 301 (a)
since all of the employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement in
question were "supervisors" and section 2(3) of the act excludes supervisors
from the statutory definition of "employee."2 In denying the union's motion
to remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York held: the supervisor exclusion of section 2(3) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA) does not apply to section 301 (a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA) to deprive the court of original jurisdiction in a con-
tract dispute involving a union that is composed solely of supervisory personnel.
Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act with the object
of equalizing the bargaining power between employers and their employees. The
act guaranteed employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. The act further sought to preserve this
guarantee by preventing certain unfair practices on the employer's part. By 1947,
however, it was apparent that new legislation was needed to curb additional
labor abuses, by both the employee and employer, which had arisen in the
years following the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. Congress
responded with an act, which did not merely amend the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, but which attacked labor problems "in a comprehensive - not a
1 Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. (Emphasis added.)
2 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § Z(3), 61 Stat.
137-38, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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piecemeal - fashion." 3 Thus, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
is composed of five titles, only one of which contains the amended National
Labor Relations Act.
Because of this structure, an understanding of the degree to which the
various titles of the LMRA are interrelated is essential to resolving the issue
which arose in Isbrandtsen. Title I of the LMRA, entitled "Amendment of
National Labor Relations Act," contains the entire revised version of that act.
This title deals primarily with unfair labor practices, union certification, and
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Section 2(3) of the
NLRA was amended to exclude supervisory employees from the statutory defini-
tion of "employee." 4 This amendment was an immediate response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,s which upheld the Board's
ruling that an employer's refusal to bargain with its supervisory employees con-
stituted an unfair labor practice. Title III of the LMRA contains, among
other subjects, provision for federal jurisdiction over labor organizations in breach
of contract actions. Section 301(a)' was motivated by a desire to promote
more responsible labor relations by making the union, as well as the employer,
answerable for breach of collective bargaining agreements in federal courts.7
Because of this grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts, the provision was
placed in a title separate from Title I, which specifies the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board.' Title V of the LMRA contains a section
defining terms used generally throughout the act, a savings provision, and a
separability clause. Section 501 (1) of this title defines "industry affecting com-
merce," 9 while section 501(3) provides that the terms "labor organization" and
"employee" "shall have the same meaning as when used in the National Labor
Relations Act as amended by this Act." 10
Thus, to find the statutory meaning of the phrase "labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce" contained in section
301(a) of Title III, one must first turn to section 501(1) of Title V, which
provides a definition of "industry affecting commerce." For a definition of
"labor organization" and "employee," one must then turn to section 501(3).
This section requires one to return to the amended NLRA in Title I where one
discovers that a "labor organization" is one composed of "employees." Section
3 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1947).
4 See note 2 supra. Section 2(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 138, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1964), provides further that "the term
'labor organization' means any organization . .. in which employees participate .. ."
5 330 U.S. 485.'(1947). See also H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947);
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947).
6 See note I supra.
7 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947):
"[TMo encourage the making of agreements and to promote industrial peace
through faithful performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting inter-
state commerce should be enforceable in the Federal courts."
See generally id. at 15-18.
8 See Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 Gao. WASH. L. REv.
285 (1960); Note, Section 301(a) and the Federal Common Law of Labor Agreements, 75
YALE LJ. 877 (1966).
9 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 501(1), 61 Stat.
161, 29 U.S.C. § 14Z(1) (1964).
10 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 501(3), 61 Stat.
161, 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1964).
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2(3) of this same title provides that the statutory definition of "employee" ex-
cludes supervisors. Therefore, the union's contention in Isbrandtsen that section
301 (a), by its very language, excludes unions solely representing supervisory
personnel1 appears to be a valid interpretation of that section.
This reading of section 301 (a) was approved by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. National Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n." In that case, the employer brought suit against the
union 3 for injunctive relief and damages under section 301 (a) for alleged breach
of a collective bargaining agreement. Two questions were presented to the Second
Circuit: first, whether the dispute was a "labor dispute" within the meaning
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining
a peaceful strike; and second, whether section 301 (a) granted jurisdiction over
a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union covering
only supervisory personnel. Deciding the dispute was a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Second Circuit went on to discuss
the employer's suit for damages. On this issue, the court stated that "if they
[the members of the union] are 'supervisors,' then MEBA is not a 'labor organi-
zation representing employees' for the purpose of this action."' 4
Two other courts, in dictum, have interpreted section 301(a) in a like
manner. In Retail Clerks, Local 330 v. Lake Hills Drug Co., 6 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington noted that only
supervisory personnel were covered by the contract in question in Bull. The
court stated that "it would have been completely contrary to the spirit if not
the letter of the language of Section 301 for the court to have upheld jurisdiction
under such circumstances."1
7
In view of the favorable comments on Bull, a case that arose in the same
circuit as Isbrandtsen, and that approved the interpretation of section 301 (a)
advanced by the union, it would seem that the district court in Isbrandtsen
should have remanded the suit to the state court for lack of original jurisdiction.
However, the court was of the opinion that Bull was not the last word on the
question. The court felt that two Second Circuit cases decided subsequent to
Bull had "cast doubt" on the validity and continued effect of that decision's
application of the statutory definitions contained in Title I to section 301 (a) of
Title III."8
In the first of these two cases, National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v.
NLRB,"5 the court enforced an NLRB cease and desist order against National
11 Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 71,
74 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
12 250 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957).
13 It should be noted that in Isbrandtsen, District 2, MEBA, not National MEBA, was
the union involved.
14 A. H. Bull. S. S. Co. v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 250 F.2d 332, 336
(2d Cir. 1957).
15 International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots of America, Inc. v. NLRB,
351 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Retail Clerks, Local 330 v. Lake Hills Drug Co., 49 CCH
Lab. Cas. 18,916, at 31,246 (W.D. Wash. 1964).
16 Retail Clerks, Local 330, supra note 15.
17 Id. at 31,247.
18 Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 73
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
19 274 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960).
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MEBA, concluding that since the union admitted nonsupervisory personnel
into membership, it was a "labor organization" that could be found guilty of
an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.20 What appears to "cast doubt" on
Bull's interpretation of section 301(a) is the court's statement that Bull
"arose in a different context and under a different section... ; we are not willing
to carry what was there said into the determination whether a union is a 'labor
organization' under § 8(b) ."21 This statement was clarified in the second case
that Isbrandtsen cited as casting doubt on Bull. In United States v. National
Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n,22 Judge Friendly observed:
In National Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. N.L.R.B..... though
we accepted the proposition that a union comprised wholly of supervisors
would not be a "labor organization" within § 8(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act . . . we held that, on the facts there presented, the Board
was justified in finding that non-supervisory employees participated in
these two unions s and hence in holding them within that section.
The question of whether the statutory definition of "employee" in Title I
should apply to provisions outside of that title arose in this second MEBA case
when National MEBA and other maritime unions composed of supervisors called
a strike that halted approximately half of all American shipping.24 The district
court granted the government an injunction under the national emergency pro-
visions contained in section 208 of Title II of the LMRA. 5 On the appeal
from the injunction order, the union contended, somewhat similar to the argument
made by the union in Isbrandtsen, that the reference to "employees" in the
section 501(2) definition of "strike"2 is governed by section 2(3) of the
amended NLRA. 7 In rejecting this argument and affirming the injunction
order, the Second Circuit expressed the view that nothing in the legislative his-
tory of the LMRA "conveys any thought that supervisory employees were to
be excluded from any provisions outside Title I, the National Labor Relations
Act as amended." 2  The Second Circuit further observed that Bull had not
really determined whether a union comprised of supervisors was subject to
section 301 (a), the decision in Bull having proceeded "on the basis that in any
20 Id. at 174.
21 Ibid.
22 294 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1961).
23 Id. at 390. Note that in Isbrandtsen there was some question as to whether some of
the members of the union, not covered by the collective bargaining agreement, were super-
visors. Because the court squarely faced the issue of whether a union comprised solely of super-
visors constitutes a "labor organization representing employees" for the purposes of a 301(a)
suit, it was not necessary to decide that question. Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 71 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
24 United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 386 (2d
Cir. 1961).
25 Ibid.
26 Section 208(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),
61 Stat. 155, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964), allows federal courts to enjoin any "strike or lock-
out" which may "imperil the national health or safety . . . ." Section 501(2) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 161, 29 U.S.C. § 142(2)
(1964), defines the term "strike" to include "any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by
employees . .. .." (Emphasis added.)
27 United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 390 (2d
Cir. 1961).
28 Id. at 392.
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event ... an anti-strike injunction was prohibited by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. ... "29 In other words, that language in Bull which some had understood
as conclusive of the issue presented in Isbrandtsen0 was merely dictum, however
strong that dictum may have been.
Whether the legislative history of the LMRA "supports the view that the
supervisor exclusion of NLRA § 2(3) does not apply to LMRA § 301""
depends largely upon the selectivity with which one inquires into it. There is
an abundance of legislative history from which to choose.3 2 The most persuasive
statements in support of the court's view in Isbrandtsen are its references to the
bill introduced in 1946 by Congressman Francis Case to amend the NLRA.ss
This bill was passed by both Houses of Congresss4 but was vetoed by the
President.35 The Case Bill contained the predecessors of sections 2(3) and
501 (3).'8 Most significantly, it also contained the predecessor of section 301 (a),
which provided in part that "all collective-bargaining contracts shall be mutually
and equally binding and enforceable either at law or in equity against each of
the parties thereto . . . ."" (Emphasis added.) As the court in Isbrandtsen
was quick to point out, if the Case bill had become law, federal courts would
have had jurisdiction in labor contract disputes "without reference to the status
of the employees represented by one of said parties."'"
Changes were made in the Case bill, however, before section 301 (a)
emerged in its present form. The original House version of the section gave
federal courts jurisdiction "if such contract affected commerce . . . ."' The
Senate version, which was eventually adopted in the conference agreement,
made the jurisdictional test whether the employer was in an industry affecting
commerce or whether the labor organization represented employees in such an
industry."0 In Isbrandtsen, the court read the latter change to "labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce" to be "a more
fluent and acceptable manner of expressing the notion that federal courts were
to have jurisdiction only if the union involved represented men who performed
29 Id. at 390.
30 See, e.g., Peck, Venue and Jurisdiction in Suits To Enforce Labor Contracts, 35 U.
DaT. L.J. 505, 506 (1958).
31 Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 74-75
'(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
32 As two recent commentators have observed, "it must be remembered that there is
such an abundance of legislative history [of the Taft-Hartley Act] that any conclusion reached
could be said to be in accordance with the legislative intent." Sullivan and Tomlin, The
Supreme Court and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 42 TExAs L. REv.
214, 222 n.47 (1963). They further note that "in nearly every Supreme Court decision
concerned with section 301, both the majority and minority opinion have relied on the
legislative history to support their positions." Id. at 227-28. In support of this observation,
see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
33 92 CONG. REc. 525 (1946).
34 Id. at 1070 (House of Representatives); Id. at 5739 '(Senate).
35 Id. at 6674-6678.
36 Id. at 527.
37 Ibid.
38 Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 75
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
39 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 65-66 (1947).
40 Id. at 66.
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their labors in an industry affecting interstate commerce. '41 Moreover, the
court reasoned, section 301(a) specifies that "industry affecting commerce" is
to be understood "as defined in this Act." 2 If Congress intended that sections
2(3) and 501(3), the definition sections, were to be applicable automatically
to section 301(a), the use of the phrase "as defined in this Act" to modify
"industry affecting commerce," would be superfluous."
It may be argued, however, that the phrase "as defined in this Act" is
superfluous. Section 501, which contains the definitions of terms used through-
out the act, begins with the words, "When used in this Act-.," Furthermore,
except for the word "industry," the definition of "industry affecting commerce"
in section 501 (1) is not substantially different from the definition of "affecting
commerce" in section 2(7) of Title I." Thus, the drafters of the LMRA could
just as easily have taken care of the phrase "industry affecting commerce" by
providing, as they did for the terms "labor organization" and "employee" in
section 501(3), that reference should be made back to the definitions contained
in Title I.
It is true that the conference agreement was intended to reflect an emphasis
on the jurisdictional requirement that the industry involved, rather than the
agreement, affect commerce. However, the Isbrandtsen court's reading the in-
clusion of the phrase "labor organization representing employees" as a more
"fluent" manner in which to express that emphasis is arguably too all-inclusive.
A better explanation for the inclusion of that phrase is that section 301 (a) was
to be "read in connection with the provisions of section 8 of Title I, also dealing
with breach of contracts.""0 The reason for this was that the original Senate
version of section 8 also made it an unfair labor practice to breach a collective
bargaining agreement." If these latter provisions had been adopted, the court
hearing a 301 (a) suit undoubtedly would feel compelled to use the same criteria
the NLRB must use in determining whether it has jurisdiction over an unfair
labor practice suit.4" In other words, the court clearly would be bound to use
the statutory definitions of "labor organization" and "employee" contained in
41 Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 76
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
42 See supra note 1.
43 Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 76
(E.D.N.Y., 1966).
44 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 501, 61 Stat. 161, 29
U.S.C. § 142 (1964).
45 Section 501(1) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act), 61 Stat. 161, 29 U.S.C. § 142(1) (1964), provides: "The term 'industry affecting
commerce' means any industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would
burden or obstruct commerce or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free flow of
commerce." Section 2(7) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act), 61 Stat. 138, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1964), provides: "The term 'affecting commerce'
means in commerce or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or
having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or free
flow of commerce."
46 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1947).
47 Id. at 20, 23.
48 The conference agreement omitted this provision because it was determined that "the
enforcement of [collective bargaining contracts] should be left to the usual processes of the
law and not to the National Labor Relations Board." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 42 (1947). See note 8 supra.
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Title I in determining if the union before it in a 301 (a) suit was a "labor
organization representing employees."
Moreover, other sections of Title III provide additional insight into the
intended connectedness between Title I and Title III. In particular, section
303 authorizes a civil action for damages to anyone injured as a consequence of
those unfair labor practices defined in section 8(b) (4)." In hearing these
suits, the court must interpret and apply the same provision that the NLRB
considers in an unfair labor practice proceeding. ° This requirement qualifies
the conclusion of the court in United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, heavily relied upon by the court in Isbrandtsen, that the supervisor exclu-
sion of section 2(3) is applicable only to Title I.V '
The factor most responsible for the problem that arose in Isbrandtsen, and
indeed in all cases where the question has arisen whether to apply the supervisor
exclusion of Title I to provisions in other titles, is the lack of a provision in
the LMRA clearly defining the status of supervisors. While section 14(a) of
Title I provides that supervisors may become or remain members of labor
organizations, it also stipulates that "no employer subject to this Act shall be
compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for
the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining."
(Emphasis added.)52 There is also language in the legislative history that "this
amendment does not mean that employers cannot still bargain with such super-
visors and include them, if they see fit, in collective-bargaining contracts."" It
is doubtful, however, that the proponents of the act ever envisioned a case
where a contract dispute between an employer and a union representing super-
visory personnel would come to the federal courts under section 301 (a)."' The
act's proponents were well aware that the only collective bargaining agreement
between a major employer and a major union composed of supervisory person-
nel up to that time had been discontinued after a short period of time. 5 They
no doubt felt that employers, once freed from the requirement of bargaining
with supervisors by the new act, would refrain from entering into such collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Thus, section 14(a) may be viewed as a harmless
compromise to the opponents of supervisory exclusion.56
49 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303, 61 Stat. 158-59,
as amended, 73 Stat. 545, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
50 See Note, supra note 8, at 882.
51 United States v. National Marine Engr's Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 392
(2d Cir. 1961). It must be noted that the conclusion of the court in United
States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n was perhaps unnecessary for
disposition of the matter in the case. There the court was interpreting the "emergency pro-
visions" contained in Title II. If any title is truely a distinct entity from Title I because of
the legislative history of LMRA, it is Title II. These Title II provisions were promulgated
to replace the then expiring Smith-Connally Act but were not initially intended to be part
of the LMRA. See Reilly, supra note 8, at 296.
52 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 14(a), 61 Stat. 151,
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1964).
53 S. REP'. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947).
54 See Sullivan and Tomlin, upra note 32, at 228.
55 See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947); 93 CONG. RVc. 4136 (1947).
56 No one saw this more clearly than those who were opposed to the amendment to the
NLRA excluding supervisors:
We find seriously objectionable the complete exclusion from procedures and
protections of the act of supervisors as a class. The beguiling statement of principle
[April, 1967]
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That compromise, however, has led to the perplexing situation which arose
in Isbrandtsen. Though the court's interpretation of the legislative history of
the LMRA may be questioned, and though the result reached may contribute
to a somewhat "piecemeal" interpretation of an act which was intended to be
"comprehensive," it is submitted that the court reached a desirable result in
retaining jurisdiction rather than remanding to the state court. The present
need to bind supervisory unions to their contracts under section 301(a) is just
as essential today as was the need to bind unions composed of statutory "em-
ployees" in 1947."'
The marine industry, in particular, exemplifies this need. The situation
there has been described by one writer as "chaotic.""8 Three different unions
represent the three main types of supervisory personnel, while several others
represent the statutory employees." Moreover, where supervisory unions allow
statutory employees membership, the union might be able to use section 301 (a)
as a war club. It could claim to be a "labor organization representing employees"
when it wishes to enforce a contract under section 301 (a), or it could claim to
be a union of "supervisors" when it wishes to escape federal jurisdiction or
enforcement of the contract under section 301(a) This does not comport
with the Congressional desire to promote the mutual responsibility necessary for
industrial peace by giving federal courts jurisdiction over unions in breach of
contract disputes0 Allowing federal jurisdiction in all disputes over collective
bargaining agreements without having to inquire into the status of the mem-
bers of the union represented, however, would comport with that Congressional
desire.
Whether or not the legislative history of sections 2(3) and 301(a) support
the result reached in Isbrandtsen, the district court's holding is consistent with
the expansionist attitude the United States Supreme Court has taken in de-
veloping section 301 (a) into the most important of federal laws governing
collective bargaining agreements. Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Millis that section 301 (a)
"authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement
of... collective bargaining agreements,"" a number of jurisdictional problems
have arisen.64 These questions have been resolved by federal courts with little
in section 14 that recognizes their natural right to selfoorganization and self-help
is made meaningless by the removal of the legal sanctions that. give vitality and
substance to the right. S. MINoRiTY REP. No. 105, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
39 '(1947).
57 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
58 Pressman, Case Study In Labor-Management Relations: Maritime In'dustry---1965,
7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 805 (1966).
59 Id. at 806.
60 Mr. Justice Douglas recognized this problem when he stated: "It [MEBA] apparently
claims to be a 'labor organization' when it is to its advantage to do so and protests against
being so labeled when that position serves its end." Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v.. Interlake
S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 188 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
61 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
62 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
63 Id. at 451.
64 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, ,320 U.S. 195
(1962); American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Division, Int'l Union: of Operating
Engineers, 338 F.2d 837 '(3d Cir. 1964), aert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
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in the way of expressed legislative intent to guide them. 5 The result reached
in Isbrandtsen logically can be encompassed within the mandate of Lincoln
Mills. Such a result tends to promote industrial peace by allowing federal courts
to assume jurisdiction over unions in breach of contract disputes without inquiry
into the status of the members represented.
Robert R. Rossi
TRUSTS -THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Is ABOLISHED AND AN
END LIMITATION TO THE SETTLOR'S HEIRS OR NEXT OF KIN CREATES A BENE-
FICIAL INTEREST IN THOSE DESIGNATED CLASSES. - In 1923, Miss Anna
Hatch created a spendthrift trust, directing the trustee to manage, invest, and
control the property conveyed and to pay the annual income from the trust
estate to the settlor for life. She further directed that, upon her death, the
trustee was to convey the corpus of the trust to those she appointed by will and,
if she failed to make such an appointment, the corpus was to go to "such of
her next of kin . . . as by the law in force in the District of Columbia at the
death of the ... [settlor] shall be provided for in the distribution of an intes-
tate's personal property therein."' Outside of the reservation of the testamentary
power of appointment, Miss Hatch retained no control over the corpus what-
soever, and the trust instrument expressly stated that she conveyed the property
"irrevocably." Feeling that the income from the trust was insufficient for her
to live "in accordance with her refined but yet modest tastes,' 2 Miss Hatch
brought a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
to compel the trustee to pay her an additional 5,000 dollars a year from the
corpus of the trust. The district court, although finding the request to be a
reasonable one, granted a summary judgment for the trustee because by the
trust instrument the settlor had surrendered all control over the corpus, except
for the testamentary power of appointment, and had expressly made the trust
"irrevocable." On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the appellant sought to establish a right to modify the trust arrangement
by invoking a common la' rule of ancient vintage, the doctrine of worthier title.
According to the teaching of this doctrine, an inter vivos conveyance of an
interest in land or an interest in things other than land with an end limitation
to the conveyor's "heirs" or "next of kin," raises a presumption that no beneficial
interest is conveyed to the heirs or next of kin, a presumption overcome only
if a contrary intent is found from additional language in the instrument of con-
veyance or other circumstances.' As applied to this case, the doctrine would
require that the trust instrument, seemingly creating a life estate in the settlor
with a remainder in the settlor's "next of kin," would in fact create no beneficial
interest in the next of kin but would leave a reversion in the settlor unless a
contrary intention was shown. If the appellant thus had both the life estate and
the reversionary interest in the trust estate, she would have been the sole bene-
65 See Sullivan and Tomlin, supra note 32, at 227-28.
1 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2 Id. at 561.
3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314(1) (1940).
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ficiary, as well as the settlor, and clearly could have revoked or modified under
well established principles of trust law.4 The Court of Appeals met the appellants
argument head on and, affirming the lower court, held: the doctrine of worthier
title forms no part of the law of trusts of the District of Columbia and any act
or words of a settlor of a trust which would validly create a remainder interest
in a third party may create a valid remainder interest in the settlor's "heirs"
or "next of kin." Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The doctrine of worthier title, so heavily relied upon by the appellant, dates
back to feudal times where it developed as a rule of real property.5 As such,
it was an admixture of the two factors which most typically characterized the
legal system of that period: a curious fascination with technical and legalistic
rules, and a staunch policy to protect the interests of the feudal lord. According
to feudal law, certain incidents attached to the land which were imposed upon
the heir in favor of the lord when he took by descent.6 In order to circumvent
these incidents, it became the practice to transfer land to prospective heirs
by will or as remaindermen of an inter vivos conveyance. Thus, the heirs would
take by purchase rather than descent, and the feudal incidents would not apply.
Such a practice was inimical to feudal policy and the predictable answer was
a new rule nullifying the attempts to deprive the lord of his traditional rights.
The rule was the doctrine of worthier title. Historically, this rule has been
broken down into two-branches, the testamentary or wills branch and the inter
vivos branch. The wills branch declared that a will, purporting to devise to
an heir an estate of the same quantity and quality as the heir would take upon
descent, was ineffective in making the heir a devisee and he took by descent.'
The inter vivos branch prohibited a grantor from limiting a remainder to his
own heirs. Under this branch of the rule, it was held that the grantor retained a
reversionary interest, and the heirs would take, if at all, by descent.8 Since the
rationale of the doctrine was to prevent the frustration of feudal policy, it was
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 339 (1959); see 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 339 (2d
ed. 1956).
5 The doctrine of worthier title should not be confused with the Rule in Shelley's Case,
another feudal property rule which still survives to haunt unwary conveyancers. Shelley's Rule
operates, in certain instances, upon an end limitation to the grantee's heirs, whereas the doctrine
of worthier title is of concern when the end limitation is to the grantor's own heirs.
6 The chief incidents were relief, a payment to the lord required of the heir for the
privilege of succeeding to the interest in the land; wardship, by which the lord was entitled
to the profits of the land during their heir's minority; and marriage, which gave the lord the
right to arrange a suitable marriage for the ward and reap any profit from the arrangement.
1 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 14-15 (3d ed. 1939).
7 The testamentary branch gave rise to the name of the doctrine as it was deemed that
title acquired by descent was in some way "worthier" than title gained through purchase.
Professor Warren has claimed that the appellation "worthier title" is a misleading misnomer
when applied to the situation in which there is an inter vivos conveyance with a limitation
to the grantor's heirs. Warren, A Remainder to Grantor's Heirs, 22 TExAs L. Rxv. 22,
26-28 (1943). The testamentary branch of the doctrine is of little more than historical
interest, and the Restatement takes the position that it is no longer a part of American common
law. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314(2) (1940).
8 The English cases firmly establishing this common law rule were decided near the end
of the sixteenth century. There were a few earlier cases declaring the rule, but the first leading
case on the subject appears to be Fennick and Mitfords Case, 1 Leon. 182, 74 Eng. Rep.
168 (K.B. 1589). For an excellent discussion of the early English cases, see Morris, The
Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 133, 135-39 (1949).
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applied as a rule of law.9 The doctrine applied only to real property and per-
sisted in this form in England until abolished by statute in 1833.10
In this country, the doctrine was accepted as a rule of law in those jurisdic-
tions which showed an awareness of its existence.1 A major turning point for
the doctrine in this country came with the celebrated case of Doctor v. Hughes,'
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1919. In that case, the trust deed
conveying certain real property created a life estate in the grantor and provided
that on the death of the grantor the property was to be conveyed to his "heirs
at law." Upon a suit by creditors against a daughter of the grantor, it became
necessary to determine whether she, as heir apparent, had any beneficial interest
in the property in question. In an opinion by Judge Cardozo, the court rec-
ognized that under the doctrine of worthier title the grantor would retain a
reversion, and the daughter would have no interest whatsoever. While refusing
to apply the doctrine as a rule of law, the court declared that the rule persisted
as a rule of construction and, as such, gave rise to a rebuttable presumption
that the grantor did not intend to vest a beneficial interest in his "heirs. '"'
Although the change in the doctrine's force from a rule of law to one of con-
struction was a somewhat surprising judicial technique," the decision, perhaps
because of the eminence of the court and the jurist, revived and gave new
impetus to the doctrine in this country.' The utilization of the doctrine as a
canon of construction has been widely followed and is accepted as the modem
common law rule and applied to personal as well as real property. 6
9 In Godolphin v. Abingdon, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432 (Ch. 1740), it was said
that "a man cannot raise a fee simple to his own right heirs, by the name of heirs, as a pur-
chase, by any form of conveyance whatsoever." Hargrave described the doctrine of worthier
title as "a positive rule of our law." 1 HARGRAVE, TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 571 (1787).
10 The Inheritance Act, 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, § 4 (1833). The doctrine survived until
this time although the feudal incidents had been abolished long before. The Tenures Abolition
Act, 1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (abolishing wardship and marriage); Fraudulent Devises Act,
1691, 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 14.
11 E.g., King v. Dunham, 31 Ga. 743 '(1861); Harris v. McLaran, 30 Miss. 533 (1855);
Robinson v. Blankenship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S.W. 854 (1906). For a relatively recent case
applying the doctrine as a rule of law, see Wilson v. Pharris, 203 Ark. 614, 158 S.W.2d 274
(1941).
12 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
13 "But at least the ancient rule survives to this extent, that to transform into a remainder
what would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the transformation must be dearly
expressed." Id. at 312, 122 N.E. at 222.
14 There is no apparent logical reason why an ancient rule of law should be diluted
into a modem rule of construction. The doctrine as a rule of construction has been justified
on the grounds that it reflects the intention of the average conveyor and that it increases the
alienability of property. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314, comment a (1940). But it has
been suggested that Cardozo's decision may well have been intended as the first step in ridding
the law of an unwanted rule of law. Verrall, The Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Questionable
Rule of Construction, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 371, 373-74 (1959).
15 Before the New York court's decision, many courts had considered similar situations
without giving any indication that they were even aware of the existence of the doctrine.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Langmaid, 171 Mass. 309, 50 N.E. 606 (1898); Christ v. Kuehne,
172 Mo. 118, 72 S.W. 537 '(1903). New York's intermediate appellate court made no mention
of the doctrine when it considered the Doctor case. Doctor v. Hughes, 174 App. Div. 767,
161 N.Y. Supp. 634 (1916).
16 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314 (1940). The extension of the doctrine to include
personal as well as real property has frequently been accomplished without any mention on
the part of the courts that they were conscious of making such an extension. The New York
court has conceded that it had "assumed" that transfers of personal property were embraced
by the doctrine., Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 43, 47, 19 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1939).
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The doctrine, as a rule of construction, has been difficult to apply, especially
in the state which spawned it as such.17 Given that an end limitation to the
grantor's "heirs" or "next of kin" raises a rebuttable presumption that the
grantor or settlor intended to convey no beneficial interest to these designated
classes, the paramount problem is the determination of what indicia of a
contrary intent are sufficient to overcome the presumption. The New York
court has attempted to set forth those factors which it considers to be significant
in making this determination, but the application of these abstract guides to
varying and complex trust instruments has left a line of cases which are con-
fused and inconsistent. 9 Generally, it may be said that the presumption that
the grantor wished to retain a reversion has lost much of its force and that the
evidence sufficient to rebut it need not be overwhelming." New York has taken
limited legislative action to relieve the confusion which has resulted from its
courts' attempts to apply the doctrine as a rule of construction." The legislatures
of several other states have abolished the doctrine outright, either as a rule of
law or a canon of construction.
2 2
The District of Columbia was one of the first jurisdictions in this country
17 The majority of the cases dealing with the doctrine as a rule of construction have arisen
in New York. As the jurisdiction which proposed this version of the doctrine, it has been
the most committed to it and consequently has been forced to adjudicate many cases in an
attempt to clarify its holding in Doctor.
18 Basically, those factors which evidence an intention on the part of the settlor to give
a remainder to his heirs or next of kin are a full and formal disposition of the principal of the
trust property; no reservation of a power to grant or assign an interest in the property during
the settlor's lifetime; a surrendering of all control over the trust property except the power
to make testamentary disposition thereof; and no provision for the return of any part of the
principal to the settlor during his lifetime. Richardson v. Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 144,
81 N.E.2d 54, 59 (1948).
19 For an excellent and thorough discussion of the New York cases, see Verrall, supra
note 14, at 373-87. The New York court itself has spoken of the "almost ephemeral qualities
which go to prove the necessary intent" that the settlor wished to convey a beneficial interest
to the heirs or next of kin. In the Matter of Burchell, 299 N.Y. 351, 361, 87 N.E.2d 293,
297 (1949). In a dissenting opinion in the same case, Judge Fuld called upon the New York
legislature for clarifying legislation. In the Matter of Burchell, supra at 362, 87 N.E.2d at
298-99 (dissenting opinion).
20 Id. at 360, 87 N.E.2d at 297.
21 N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 23 and N.Y. REAL PRoPERTY LAw §, 118 (McKinney
Supp. 1966), provide that for the purposes of revocation of a trust
a gift or limitation, contained in a trust created on or after September first4 nineteen
hundred fifty-one, in favor of a class of persons described only as heirs or next of kin
or distributees of the creator of the trust, or by other words of like import, does not
create a beneficial interest in such persons.
This legislation extends only to the situation in which revocation of the trust is sought. The
effect of the doctrine must still be considered when the conveyor makes an inter vivos con-
veyance with an end limitation to his own heirs and a subsequent case arises involving
creditors' rights, a dispute between the heirs and the grantor's devisees or an attempted
conveyance by the grantor. For a critical evaluation of the amendments, see 26 -N.Y.U.L.,
Rv. 678 (1951); 26 ST. JOHN's L. Rtv. 201 (1951).
22 The doctrine has been abolished in California, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1073 (Supp. 1966);
Illinois, ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 188-89 (1957); Kansas (as to wills only), KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-506 (1964); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.14(4) (1947); Nebraska,
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-114, 115 (1958) (adopting the UNIFORM PROPERTY AcT §§ 14-15);
Texas, TEx. Crv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, art. 1291a (Supp. 1966).,
In Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 85-504 (1955), and North Carolina, N.C.'GEN. STAT. §
41-6 (1966), the rule is avoided by establishing a constructional preference for con-
struing a limitation to "A's heirs" to mean "A's children." In Pennsylvania,- a statute which
provides that a limitation to the heirs of a conveyor shall be construed to mean the heirs at
the time the conveyance takes effect in enjoyment nullifies the effect of the doctrine. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 180.14(4), 301.14(1) (1950).
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to accept the doctrine of worthier title and apply it vigorously as a rule of law.23
Now, with its decision in Hatch, the District's highest court has become the
first judicial tribunal to flatly abolish the doctrine.24
In construing an instrument of the type which was involved in Hatch,
the court's primary duty is to give effect to the settlor's intention as long as so
doing does not contravene public policy.2" Since it matters little to society
whether the settlor, by an end limitation to his "next of kin," meant to create
a remainder in them or to retain a reversion in himself, a meaningful evaluation
of the court's decision must begin with the question of whether its result or one
dictated by the doctrine of worthier title most closely effectuates the intention
of a settlor who draws up a trust instrument of this kind.2" One of the primary
reasons advanced for the retention of the doctrine as a rule of construction
is that the rule in fact reflects the probable intention of the typical settlor.27
Those who argue that the doctrine's rule of construction is justified on the
basis that it represents the probable intention of the average conveyor believe
that where a person purportedly creates a gift over to his own heirs and also
gives himself an estate for life, he seldom intends to create an indestructible
interest in those persons who would take his property by intestacy. Rather, it
is believed that the conveyor intends the same as if he had given the remainder
"to my estate."2 To an objection that the settlor has expressly declared that
he is creating a remainder in his next of kin, it has been argued that end limita-
tions such as these are frequently merely "tacked on" words, attractive to the
legal mind's sense of symmetry, which are used with no thought of creating a
beneficial interest."9 In addition, such end limitations may be no more than
legal "magic words" by which the settlor's attorney, mindful of past judicial
interpretation of such phrases, has indicated the settlor's intention to retain a
reversionary interest in the trust estate.
Those who would agree with the court's interpretation that the trust in-
strument in Hatch created a valid remainder interest in the settlor's next of kin
point out that when a court interprets an end limitation as a reversion, it is
proceeding against the express words of the settlor. While it is true the word
"heirs" once referred to an indefinite line of succession and, as such, would
seem to support the contention that the use of an end limitation of this type
means no more than "to my estate," it is now well settled that a gift to "heirs"
is a gift to the specific persons who qualify as such, not to heirs from generation
23 Miller v. Fleming, 7 Mackey 139 (D.C. 1889).
24 Many courts have indicated their aversion for the doctrine when it has been pressed
upon them as dispositive of the facts before them. However, while construing the limitation
to the "heirs" as creating a beneficial interest in that group, they have not been willing
to go so far as to judicially abolish the doctrine. See, e.g., Peter v. Peter, 136 Md. 157, 110
At. 211 (1920); Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939).
25 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 4'(2d ed. 1956).
26 In the fact situation involved in Hatch, the final result may have been the same whether
the doctrine was considered a rule of construction or whether the approach taken by the
District of Columbia court was adopted. The four factors which the New York court has
found -to be significant in evidencing the settlor's intent to create a remainder, see supra
note 18, are all present in this case.
27 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314, comment a (1940).
28 Ibid.
29 Morris, supra note 8, at 175.
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to generation."0 Moreover, the settlor who uses such terms as "heirs" or "next
of kin" is quite often cognizant of the individuals who will qualify for the
remainder under the terms he has employed. Keeping this in mind, it is more
believable that the settlor in fact intended to create a beneficial interest in those
he knew to be his prospective heirs." ' If he wished to retain a reversion, the
attorney drafting the trust instrument has much clearer terms at his disposal to
indicate this intention than to use an end limitation of the type under con-
sideration.
Proponents of the abolition of worthier title as a rule of construction have
also claimed that the doctrine has bred expensive litigation and has occasionally
caused excessive taxing of estates. Reflecting on New York's unhappy experience
with the doctrine as a rule of construction, Professor Powell has declared that
in New York
no case involving a substantial sum can be fairly regarded as closed until
it has been carried to the Court of Appeals. A similar situation is to be
expected in other states. This means uncertainty in the law and waste-
ful expenditures of money by helpless clients.32
The application of the doctrine may also have the unfortunate result of in-
cluding the whole trust corpus in the decedent's estate for the purpose of the
federal estate tax.3
In Hatch, the District of Columbia court addressed itself at the outset
to this question of intent. In its analysis, the court, agreeing with those com-
mentators who have proposed complete abolition of the doctrine, found that
30 3 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY 87 n.6 (1947). This evolution has been caused by the
now universal use of intestacy statutes which specifically describe those persons who are to
be considered the "heirs." See generally Casner, Construction of Gifts to "Heirs" and the
Like, 53 HARV. L. REv. 207 (1939).
31 The court points out that, although it might be tempting to say that the settlor in-
tended to create no beneficial interest in his heirs when he said "to myself for life, remainder
to my heirs" when the question is a modest modification of the trust, the same result is far
from appealing if the settlor dies without revoking the trust and leaves a will which makes
no provisions for the heirs whom he assumed to be taken care of by the trust. Hatch v.
Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Before the widespread use of wills, in
the days when the doctrine of worthier title was in full flower, the possibility of this situation
was remote and the heirs-at-law would take the property as heirs of the conveyor's reversion.
32 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY f 381, at 269 (1952). The New York legislature has also
acted to remove this uncertainty but it has taken the approach opposite that of the District
of Columbia court by declaring that, where the settlor wishes to revoke or modify, the
designated heirs or next of kin have no beneficial interest. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 23
and N.Y. REAL POPERTY LAw ,§ 118 (McKinney Supp. 1966). The effect of such legislation
is to return to the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of law, at least in the situation in
which the settlor seeks to revoke the trust.
33 Trust arrangements are often used as an integral part of estate planning. The doctrine
of worthier title may well cause tax problems if the settlor establishes a trust providing for
the payment of the life income to himself or a third party and a gift of the corpus to his
"heirs." If the doctrine is applied to 'this situation, it will likely be adjudged that the
settlor has retained a reversion. Under the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 2033, the value of
this reversion will be included in the gross estate of the settlor for federal estate tax purposes.
However, in a jurisdiction which has abolished the doctrine, the gift of the corpus to the
"heirs" would likely be adjudged as creating a remainder in those persons who qualify as
heirs under the relevant intestacy statute. In such a case the settlor would retain, at most, a
defeasible reversion be.cause the trust property would revert to his estate if there were a
failure of heirs. The value of this defeasible reversion would be included in the settlor's
estate but normally would be of little value. For a discussion of possible estate tax problems
which may arise in this area, see generally Verrall, supra note 14, at 400-02.
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it is questionable whether it [the doctrine] accords with the intent of the
average settlor. . . . [W]hile the dominant intent of most such trusts may
well be to benefit the life tenant during his life, a subsidiary but neverthe-
less significant purpose of many such trusts may be to satisfy a natural
desire to benefit one's heirs or next of kin. In the normal case an adult
has a pretty good idea who his heirs will be at death, and probably means
exactly what he says when he states in the trust instrument, "remainder
to my heirs."3' 4
But, aside from the consideration of the settlor's intent, the alternative reason
usually propounded in favor of the presumption of a reversion is that this tends
to increase the alienability of the subject matter of the conveyance.35 The
District of Columbia court, satisfied that the presumption of a reversion is not
in accord with the average conveyor's intent, turned its attention to- this argu-
ment and suggested a method by which the settlor might modify the trust even
though the remainder to the "heirs" is to be considered as creating a beneficial
interest in the designated class.
The court recognized that it would be undesirable to make all trusts cre-
ated under similar terms and circumstances as the one in dispute in Hatch ir-
revocable. Problems arise because "the living have no heirs" and because some
of those declared to have a beneficial interest in the estate may be unborn or
unascertained. Thus, no matter how desirable some form of modification might
be, it would be impossible to obtain the consent of all the beneficiaries.ss To
mitigate the harshness of such a result, the court held that
upon an adequate showing, by the party petitioning to revoke or modify
the trust, that those who are, so to speak, the heirs as of the present time
consent to the modification, and that there is a reasonable possibility that
the modification that has been proposed adequately protects the interests
of those other persons who might be heirs at the time the corpus is to be
distributed, the District Court may appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the interests of those additional persons.37
The circuit court's holding that the trial court may, without express statutory
authority, appoint a guardian ad litem to represent unborn interests is one which,
while seldom litigated, has been questioned. The question was one of first
impression in the District of Columbia."s At least one major jurisdiction, however,
has held that courts have no power to appoint such guardians unless the legisla-
ture has expressly authorized them to do so." Against the background of the
34 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
35 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314, comment a (1940).
36 See 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 340 at 2487-89. But any trust, no matter
how "irrevocable" by its terms, is revocable with the consent of all the beneficiaries and the
settlor.' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRuSTS § 338 '(1959). In some instances, the prospective
heirs may be allowed to act on behalf of the unborn or imascertained beneficiaries on the
theory that by protecting their own interests they thereby represent the similar interests of
the unborn beneficiaries. On representation, see generally Comment, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 199,
205-18 (1954).
37 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38 Ibid.
39 Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 154 P.2d 417, 420 (Cal. App. 1945), aff'd 27
Cal. 2d 457, 165 P.2d 15 (1946) '(Traynor, J., dissenting). Shortly after this case was de-
cided, California enacted legislation allowing the appointment of such guardians. CAL. CODE
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Anglo-American legal tradition that every party is entitled to his "day in court,"
it is apparently feared that to sanction this practice might deprive a person so
represented of due process of law. The majority of courts which have considered
the problem, however, are of the opinion that it is not inappropriate for courts
of equity to act in this area without statutory foundation."'
It is submitted that the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit to take
it upon itself, without the prodding of the legislature,4 to provide for the ap-
pointment of such guardians achieves a result which is most just for all parties
actually or potentially interested in the litigation. The court pointed out that
in a case in which the settlor may offer a quid pro quo to the heirs, the appoint-
ment of a guardian for the unborn beneficiaries may be particularly effective
in achieving a result satisfactory for ail parties concerned. For example, in a
case such as Hatch, the settlor might surrender her testamentary power of ap-
pointment, which would secure the heirs' remainder interest, in exchange for a
modification of the trust agreement so as to allow her a larger annual income.42
To refuse to appoint a guardian ad litem could frustrate both the settlor's desire
to obtain a reasonable modification of the trust and the prospective heirs' pos-
sibility of receiving the corpus.
The appointment of guardians for unborn or unascertained interests under
the circumstances outlined by the court is clearly a desirable result when viewed
in the light of the well established public policy towards increasing the alien-
ability of property. Furthermore, if the guardian's activities are properly super-
vised by the court, there would seem to be little possibility of a successful col-
lateral attack by the heirs claiming that any settlements reached were not bind-
ing on them. The binding effect of litigation or settlements in which the guardian
for the unborn interests was appointed pursuant to a statute is no longer ques-
tioned. That a collateral attack would succeed solely because the guardian
was appointed under the court's own authority is unlikely, especially since the
courts traditionally have had the power to appoint similar guardians for infants."4
By proposing the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the court in Hatch
solved the undesirable situation that may result from its holding that the "heirs" or
"next of kin" have a beneficial interest in the trust estate as remaindermen.
Thus, the court's abolition of the doctrine is a commendable judicial response
to a judicially created rule of construction which rests on bases of questionable
validity. It is conceded that the doctrine as a rule of construction has only
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 373.5 (Supp. 1966). In accord with Moxley .is McPherson v. First
& Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954).
40 See, e.g., Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587 (1935); Franklin v. Margay
Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Barlow 235 S.C. 488,
112 S.E.2d 396 (1960).
41 The court points out that such judicial initiative is particularly appropriate in the
District of Columbia where the legislature is the United States Congress, which is much more
deeply concerned with questions of national policy than such rather minor affairs as these.
Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 565 *(D.C. Cir. 1966).
42 Id. at 566.
43 The leading case is Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202 (1938). See, e.g.,
Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 657, 267 P.2d 423 (1954),
applying the California legislation, note 39 supra.
44 E.g., Flynn v. Flynn, 283 Ill. 206, 220, 119 N.E. 304, 310 (1918); Shuck v. Shuck,




given rise to uncertainty and confusion, and it is probable that it more often
frustrates rather than effectuates the typical conveyor's intent. By this decision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia correctly re-
fused to burden its jurisdiction with the remnant of an outdated rule. Its reason-
ing, if emulated, may signal the eventual death of this doctrine as a part of our
common law.
Frank H. Smith
FEDERAL ESTATE TAx - JUDGMENTS - STATE 'COURT'S DETERMINATION
OF TAXPAYER'S PROPERTY RIGHTS ACCEPTED AS AUTHORITATIVE BY FEDERAL
COURT IN APPLYING FEDERAL TAx LAWS.- In 1930, Herman Bosch set up
a revocable and amendable trust, the terms of which provided his wife, Mar-
garet Bosch, with an income for her life. Mr. Bosch amended the trust in 1931
to give his wife a general power of appointment over the corpus.1 Mrs. Bosch
purported to release a portion of her general power in 1951 in order to prevent
the assets of the trust from being taxed as part of her estate. On Herman
Bosch's death in 1957, his executor claimed a marital deduction for the value
of the trust. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, asserted that
the trust did not qualify for a marital deduction and assessed a federal tax
deficiency of $70,222. The executor thereupon filed a petition in the Tax
Court for a redetermination. While this action was pending, the executor, who
was also the trustee for the estate, began a proceeding in the New York Supreme
Court to settle his account as trustee. The key issue in that action was whether
Mrs. Bosch's release of her general power of appointment was valid. All three
briefs filed in the New York Supreme Court advocated the invalidity of that
release,2 and no argument in favor of the release was presented to that court.
The New York court decided that since Mrs. Bosch possessed at the time of
the release only a contingent power of appointment, she did not have the power
to release it. At the conclusion of this proceeding, the Commissioner admitted
that if the Tax Court were bound by the New York decision, section 2056 (b) (5)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would entitle Mrs. Bosch to a marital
deduction.' The Tax Court, while carefully stating that it did not consider
1 This was done to take advantage of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, ch. 165,
65 Stat. 91, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811'(f) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
2041).
2 Separate briefs were filed in behalf of Mrs. Bosch, the trustee, and by a guardian
ad litem in behalf of one of twenty-two minors who might possibly become beneficiaries if
Mrs. Bosch died without exercising her power of appointment. Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 512 (1966).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5) provides:
LIFE ESTATE WITH POWER OF APPOINTMENT IN SURVIVING spousE.-In the
case Of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse
is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest . . . with power in the
surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest . . . (exercisable in favor of such
surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either,
whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with
no power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific
portion, to any person other than the surviving spouse-
'(A) the interest . . . thereof so passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a),
be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1)
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itself bound by the state decree, decided that it would accept the New York
decision as an "authoritative exposition of New York law and adjudication
of the property rights involved." 4 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Judge Friendly dissenting, affinned and held: the New York judgment, rendered
by a court which had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, authori-
tatively settled the rights of the parties, not only for New York, but also for
purposes of the application of the relevant provisions of federal tax law. Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup.
Ct. 512 (1966).
The imposition of federal estate taxation is usually dependent upon a
person having certain property rights. In the absence of any express federal
criteria, the threshold question as to the nature and extent of these property
rights is ordinarily determined in accordance with state law.5 The Supreme
Court has stated: "State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal
revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."'
One would think that a corollary to such a rule would be that in a case
such as Bosch, where the state court has already determined the taxpayer's
property rights, the federal courts would be bound by that determination. For
years, however, the federal courts have wrestled with the question of the effect
to be given these state court decrees without arriving at any uniform conclu-
sion.7 In most cases, the problem arises due to the manner in which these state
determinations were made. Often, as in Bosch, the state proceeding may have
been an amicable, one-sided family affair. It may have also reached a result
questionable'under the general law of the state. In such a case, the state judge
must make his decision without benefit of an adverse presentation of both sides
of the relevant issues.
Ordinarily when state law is being determined by a federal court, the
doctrine set forth in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' is pertinent. However, as the
Bosch majority pointed out, Erie is not relevant in a situation where a state
court has already actually adjudicated the property rights of the party against
whom federal tax liability is asserted.
Similarly the federal courts are not bound in this situation by the rule
of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins .... The task here is not to discover the
general New York law applicable to releases of powers of appointment.
(A), be considered as passing to any person other than the surviving
spouse.
4 Estate of Herman J. Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 512 (1966).
5 LowNDES AND KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 54 (2d ed. 1962);
Braverman and Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation,
17 TAx L. REv. 545, 547 (1962); Sacks, The Binding Effect of Nontax Litigation in State
Courts, N.Y.U. 21st INST. ON FED. TAX 277 (1963).
6 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
7 See generally LOWNDES AND KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 55-56; 10 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INcomE TAXATiON § 61.03 (Zimet rev. 1964); Braverman and Gerson, supra note 5;
Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income Tax
Case, 12 TAx L. REv. 213 (1957); Sacks, supra note 5; Sonnenschein, The Binding Effect of
a State Court Decree With Reference to Property Rights Affected by Federal Taxation, 7 FED.
BJ. 251 '(1946).
8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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That may well be the subject of the required search in a case which
concerns a taxpayer whose own special status under New York law has
never been authoritatively determined by a New York tribunal.... It [Erie]
does not refer, and was never intended to refer, to the question of whether
or not a federal court is to accept a state determination of the rights
under state law of a party to a federal action.9
Much of the confusion in this area can be attributed to the only two
Supreme Court cases directly on point. Freuler v. Helvering0 and Blair v.
Commissioner" are authority for the general principle that a state court's de-
termination of property rights is binding and conclusive upon a federal court
determining the federal tax consequences flowing from these property rights
unless the state decree was obtained through collusion.' 2 In Freuler the Com-
missioner charged, to no avail, that the state decision was "collusive in the
sense that all the parties joined in a submission of the issues and sought a decision
which would adversely affect the Government's right to additional income
tax."' Such a definition of collusion would aid the solution of many of the
cases and would rule against the conclusive effect of the state decree in Bosch.
Unfortunately, however, the Court never expressly accepted this definition of
collusion advanced by the Commissioner. In Blair, although an appeal had
been taken in the Illinois courts, 4 the parties involved appeared less adversary
than in Freuler. The Court, however, chose to dismiss the charge that the
state proceedings were collusive simply by citing Freuler, thus leaving unan-
swered an issue they had proposed to resolve."5
The aftermath of these two cases has been that, while applying the same
general principle, the federal courts of appeals have pursued separate and con-
flicting paths due to their differing interpretations of the word collusion.'6 The
polar meanings that have been ascribed to this word are best exemplified by
the conflicting views of the Third and Fifth Circuits.
The Fifth Circuit, beginning in Saulsbury v. United States," has con-
sistently equated nonadversary with collusive.' Although they decided in
Saulsbury that the state court had not actually determined any property rights
under the trust involved, the court was clear that no matter what the state court
held, their decision was not binding. The court stated:
9 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1013 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup.
Ct. 512 (1966).
10 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
11 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
12 Accord, Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 1955); Estate of Farish v.
United States, 233 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D. Texas 1964), aff'd per curiam, 360 F.2d 595 '(5th
Cir. 1966).
13 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
14 For a discussion of the so-called "magic effect of appeal," see Colowick, supra note 5, at
225. See also Braverman and Gerson, supra note 5, at 558; Sacks, supra note 5, at 292-93.
See, e.g., Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948).
15 The Court stated that they took up the case because of the existing conflict in the cir-
cuits. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 8 (1937).
16 Northwest Security Nat'l Bank v. Welsh, 203 F. Supp. 263, 265-66 (D.S.D. 1962). See
cases cited infra notes 23-25.
17 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
18 E.g., United States v. Farish, 360 F.2d 595 "(5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Estate of
Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958).
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By the word collusion, we do not mean to imply fraudulent or improper
conduct, but simply that all interested parties agreed to the order and that
it was apparently to their advantage from a tax standpoint to do so. We
mean that there was no genuine issue of law or fact as to the right of the
beneficiary to receive this income, and no bona fide controversy between
the trustee and the beneficiary as to property rights under the trust instru-
ment.19 (Emphasis added in part.)
The Third Circuit takes a much broader view of collusion. In the leading
case of Gallagher v. Smith,2" they required a showing of actual fraud in order
to render the state court decree collusive. Noting that it is "quite common
and highly commendable for all the members of a family group interested in
a decedent's will to take a common view as to their rights under it," 1 the Third
Circuit considered nonadversity to be only some evidence of actual fraud. The
court stated:
[W]e think that the fact that the parties all favored the same result in the
state court is relevant only so far as it is evidence of collusion and should
not in and of itself vitiate in the federal court such conclusive effect as
the state law gives to the judgment with respect to the property rights
determined by itY2
In defining collusion, most of the other circuits have adopted an approach
similar to the nonadversary test of the Fifth Circuit.2 3 Some courts have con-
sidered such additional factors as the status of the state court, the precedent
value of their decisions,2" and the correctness of the state court's adjudication
under state law.2' However, a consideration of factors of this type would seem
to be the mistaken use of Erie against which the Bosch majority warned.21 The
question of collusion should deal only with the manner in which the state pro-
ceedings were carried out. Erie is irrelevant to this type of inquiry.
It is difficult to place the decision in Bosch squarely in line with any of
these conflicting precedents. In his dissent, Judge Friendly accused the majority
19 Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
906 (1953).
20 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955). Accord, Darlington's Estate v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d
693 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Beecher v. United States, 280 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960); Babcock's Estate
v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956). Cf. Watson v. United States, 355 F.2d 269
(3d Cir. 1965).
21 Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 1955).
22 Ibid.
23 E.g., Estate of Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 908 (1965); In re Swees Estate v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955). But
see, Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 '(9th Cir. 1964); Eisenmenger v. Commissioner,
145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944). Until Bosch, most of the decisions in the Tax Court adhered
to the nonadversary rule. See, e.g., Estate of Howard E. Stevens, 36 T.C. 184 (1961); Estate
of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957).
24 Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1966);
Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231, 232 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887
(1962).
25 Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 1963); Faulkerson's Estate
v. United States, supra note 24, at 232.




of aligning the Second Circuit with the Third."7 Indeed, the majority, after
admitting that a majority of the courts follow the nonadversary test, quoted
the following passage from the Third Circuit's decision in Gallagher:
So far as those parties are concerned the law of the state is what the state
court has declared and applied in their case. If the state court's judgment
has binding final effect under the state law the rights of the parties can
only be what the court has held them to be. It is for this reason that the
federal court should not in a case of this kind make an independent
examination and application of state law.28
But, it is important to note that the majority also relied heavily on the Tax
Court's decision in Bosch. In accepting the state court decision as authoritative,
that court considered such additional factors as the prior notice of the state
proceeding given to the Commissioner, the statewide jurisdiction of the New
York Supreme Court, and the possible offsetting tax consequences to Mrs.
Bosch. 9 These factors are not relevant to the Third Circuit rationale, but the
majority repeated them verbatim and considered them in making their decision.
An able Tax Court judge quite explicitly undertook to balance several
relevant factors . . . before deciding to accept the New York judgment as
authoritative of the rights of parties. We, too, have considered all of the
circumstances and feel that the decision below was correct.30 (Emphasis
added.)
The majority also agreed wholeheartedly with the Tax Court that, although
they were not "bound" by the New York decree, they would consider it authori-
tative in this case. 1 Hence, it seems that by combining Gallagher and the deci-
sion of the Tax Court, the Bosch majority adopted only a "watered down"
version of the Third Circuit approach. In so doing, they have left the Second
Circuit free to decide these cases on an ad hoc basis. Without this interpretation
of the majority's decision, it would be hard to agree with the manner in which
they distinguished Second Nat'l Bank v. United States. 2 In this case, another
panel of the Second Circuit recently decided that they were not bound to follow
a property determination made by a Connecticut Probate Court since that court
is not a court of record, has many judges that are not lawyers, and has no
precedent value within the state. The majority in Bosch apparently agreed
27 With our own court uncommitted, I regret my brothers' vote to align ourselves with
the rather mechanical view -of the Third Circuit rather than the more realistic one
of the Fourth and Fifth, thereby needlessly handicapping the Commissioner in the
fair and equal enforcement of the federal revenue laws. Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, supra note 26, at 1016 (dissenting opinion).
28 Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 1955).
29 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup.
Ct. 512 (1966).
30 Id. at 1014.
31 The issue is, then, strictly speaking, not whether the federal court is "bound by"
the decision of the state tribunal, but whether or not a state tribunal has authorita-
tively determined the rights under state law of a party to the federal action. (Empha-
sis added.) Id. at 1013.
32 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965).
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that the decrees of such a court should not be binding." Nevertheless, absent
an appeal, Connecticut probate courts do finally adjudicate the property rights
of those parties before them 4 Thus, a court strictly adhering to the prin-
ciples in Gallagher would have no occasion to decline to follow the probate
decree simply because of the nature or status of that court.
Judge Friendly's dissent, which clearly shows a strong inclination toward
the nonadversary test of the Fifth Circuit, also presents an interpretation problem.
Judge Friendly declared:
I would hold that when it is evident that state court litigation has been
brought primarily to have an effect on federal taxes, the judgment of an
inferior state court adjudicating property rights is entitled to little weight,
and that when the state court has not had the benefit of a fair presentation
of both sides of the controversy, it is entitled to none3 5 (Emphasis added.)
The interpretation problem arises in succeeding remarks in which Judge Friendly
made a thorough examination of New York law pertaining to the release of
a contingent power of appointment." He presented a convincing argument
that the New York Supreme Court erred in declaring such a power unreleasable.
His inquiry into the general New York law may well have been intended to
serve as an illustration of the injustice that may result if these ex parte judg-
ments are considered conclusive. However, Judge Friendly's language suggests
that he might have made such an examination of state law even if the invalidity
of Mrs. Bosch's release had been declared in an adversary proceeding.
Any attempt to choose the best of these irreconcilable approaches must
begin with a study of the policy considerations behind each. The Third Cir-
cuit plainly follows a policy of giving state court decisions their due and avoid-
ing the theoretical injustice that might result to the taxpayer if state decrees
were not considered binding. It has stated:
if in the absence of fraud such a (state) judgment does determine the
rights of the parties in the property they must thereafter live with it so far as
their enjoyment of the property is concerned. It is certainly logical, therefore,
that such taxation as is based solely upon the ownership of the property
should follow such a judgment.3 7
As has been noted above, the Bosch majority, although evidencing some
of the same reverence for state court decrees, actually followed the case by case
33 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87
Sup. Ct. 512 (1966). The majority stated that the decree in Second National Bank was not
authoritative in Connecticut. This is confusing since "authoritative" in Bosch meant "settling
the rights of the parties."
34 Kochuk v. Labaha, 126 Conn. 324, 10 A.2d 755 (1940). See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. ch. 774, § 45-4 (1958).
35 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1016 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87
Sup. Ct. 512 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
36 Id. at 1016-18.
37 Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 1955). See generally Teschner,
State Court Decisions, Federal Taxation, and the Commissioner's Wonderland: The Needfor Preliminary Characterization, 41 TAxEs 98 (1963); Comment, The Binding Effect of a
Nonadversary State Court Decree in a Federal Tax Determination, 33 FORDHA L. Rav. 765(1965).
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approach of the Tax Court. Quite possibly they felt that any general rule, even
the Third Circuit's, cannot always be trusted to provide an equitable result in
the varying circumstances of each case. Perhaps, it may simply be that the
majority felt the New York Supreme Court was correct in declaring Mrs..
Bosch's release invalid in this case." At any rate, this approach of "balancing
all the relevant factors" certainly leaves both the taxpayer and the Commissioner
with unanswered questions. Must the Commissioner always go into the state
court whenever he is informed of a case in that court with possible federal tax
consequences?39 For a decision to be considered authoritative in a federal court,
must the taxpayer always bring suit in a state court that has jurisdiction and
precedent value for the whole state?4"
No such ambiguities plague the Fifth Circuit where basic fairness and
justice to the Commissioner carry the day, all previous considerations of the
Third Circuit notwithstanding. Judge Friendly made a strong statement in
favor of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. "The latter [Gallagher rule] would per-
mit citizens, unwilling to accept the tax consequences of actions taken by them
or their decedents, to evade federal taxes by taking advantage of an unwitting
lower state tribunal." '4 It is submitted that this realistic view should take prece-
dence over the theoretical niceties of the Third Circuit rule. To consider only
the fact that a taxpayer has had his property rights determined by a state court
without giving controlling weight to how this determination was made would
be to ignore completely the ease with which "nominally" adverse parties may
obtain a desired decree in today's crowded courts. As a prominent member
of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice has written:
The collection of revenue should be protected from obstruction by state
court judgments procured in cases involving spurious or trumped-up issues
between parties who have no fundamental difference of opinion. Proper
administration of the tax structure requires that no taxpayer be allowed
an advantage not available to others similarly situated .... 42
The Fifth Circuit avoids this unfairness by holding the state decree collusive
and not binding whenever the Commissioner can show that the parties in the
state court did not have a real adverse interest in the property rights involved.,
Thus, a state court that has not had the benefit of hearing both sides of the
issues never has the final say.
38 Actually, one suspects that quite often the question of whether the federal court
feels bound to follow the state court decision may depend mainly upon whether
or not the federal court agrees with the state court's view of local law or whether
it feels the state court's local law views will lead to a suitable result in the federal
tax matter. LowNDES AND KRAMER, supra note 5, at 57.
39 The majority said that they believed that it would take legislation to hold the Com-
missioner "bound" whenever he has prior notice. This would not necessarily mean that notice
could not remain one of the factors to be considered. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363
F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 512 (1966).
40 Such a requirement would be consistent with the Second National Bank case. However,
it would also seem to be somewhat of an incorporation of the Erie principles which the
majority had already termed irrelevant.
41 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87
Sup. Ct. 512 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
42 Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court Decrees, 51 YALE
L.J. 783, 796 (1942).
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That such a test is not merely a formula for preventing state courts from
deciding any matters relevant to federal taxation, was illustrated recently by
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Estate of Farish.4 3 In Farish, the Com-
missioner cited the Saulsbury nonadversary rule and argued that a state declara-
tory judgment did not bind the district court. The district court, expressly
adhering to the nonadversary test, carefully reviewed the state proceedings to
ascertain their true nature. They found that the taxpayer had staunchly con-
tested the vesting of certain property lights in her husband's estate with the
trustee and a guardian ad litem. Careful attention was given to all the govern-
ment's objections to the state proceedings, and they were found either irrelevant
or unsupported by the evidence.4 The Fifth Circuit, affirming per curiam,
expressly approved the district court's approach. "
Farish illustrates that the nonadversary test does not manifest a disrespect
for state courts. Rather, it prevents them from being used unscrupulously by
parties whose sole intent is to evade federal tax liability. Actually this Fifth
Circuit test does not differ greatly from that proposed by the Commissioner
in Freuler."6 Perhaps the Supreme Court meant to adopt such a test in Freuler.
Bosch now gives the Court an opportunity to clarify their position. Hopefully
they will make the Fifth Circuit's nonadversary test uniform in all the circuits.
Hugh C. Griffin
CONTRACT LAW - SALE AND LEASEBACK ARRANGEMENT RESCINDED
WHEN REVENUE RULING FRUSTRATED ACHIEVEMENT OF TAx BENEFITS UPON
WHICH CONTRACT WAS BASED. - Ward Mayer and other stockholders -of
Timber Structures, Inc., contracted to sell the business to the West Los Angeles
Institute for Cancer Research, a tax-exempt corporation. The contracting parties
set up a complex sale and leaseback arrangement whereby both would profit
by taking advantage of the tax laws.' After a $10,000 down payment, the con-
43 360 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1966), affirming per curiam, 233 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Tex.
1964).
44 Although there was ambiguous language in Saulsbury indicating that the burden of
proof might be on the taxpayer, the district court put it squarely on the Commissioner. They
quoted from Mary Kent Miller, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1225, 1230 (1963): "Since the law
presumes that court proceedings are regular and valid, we think in a situation like this,
where 'collusion' is asserted by (the government), it is incumbent upon (it) to produce
at least some evidence to that effect." Estate of Farish v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 220, 228
(S.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 360 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1966). o
45 United States v. Farish, 360 F.2d 595, 596. In any circuit accepting the non-
adversary test, it is obvious, as shown by Farish, that the brunt of the work will be handled
by the Tax Court or the district court. The main question will always be one of fact: did
the preponderance of the evidence show the state proceedings to have been nonadversary?
Under FED. R. Civ.-P. 52(a), the court of appeals could only reverse this lower court deter-
mination if it found'it clearly erroneous.
For a full discussion of other problems that may arise in any court adopting the nonad-
versary approach and examples of the "trappings of adversarness" (briefs, oral arguments,
appeal) which "friendly" parties may interject into the state proceedings, see Braverman and
Gerson, supra note 5, at 559-66; Colowick, supra note 7, at 221-29; Sacks, supra note 5, at
288-95.
46 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
1 For extensive discussion of sale and leaseback arrangements and their tax consequences,
see Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126
(Ct. CI. 1961); Royal Farms Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 172 (1963); Anderson
Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1027 (1963); Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap
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tracting parties agreed that the Institute would liquidate the company and form
a new operating company. The Institute would then lease all the plant, ma-
chinery, and equipment of the old corporation to the new company for five
years.2 The new operating company would pay eighty percent of the operating
profits to the Institute as rent, and the Institute in turn would pay ninety percent
of the rentals to the selling stockholders as part of the purchase price. It was con-
templated that the operating company would deduct the rental payments as a
business expense, and that the Institute, because of its tax-exempt status, would
pay no tax on the rental receipts. The Mayers, stockholders of Timber Struc-
tures, believed that they would pay tax on the amounts they received from the
Institute at capital gain rates. Thus, the Institute, without paying any money
except the $10,000 down payment, would reap ten percent of the rental pay-
ments without any other risks, and eventually would own the property outright.
Subsequently, a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service was applied to the sale.'
Under this ruling, the operating company's rental payments would be taxable
to the Institute as unexempt income, and payments to the selling stockholders
would not be entitled to capital gain treatment. Mayer sued for rescission of the
contract contending that the revenue ruling completely frustrated the purpose
of the transaction. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
granted rescission of the sale and leaseback arrangement on this basis. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held: the
purpose of the sale and leaseback arrangement was frustrated by the revenue
ruling which rejected the tax premises upon which the transaction was based.
West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 'F.2d 220 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 718 (1967).
Pacta sunt servanda (agreements shall be kept) is a basic policy in our
law. Contracts should be enforced so that men who make their arrangements
in advance can rely with certainty on their contracts. Such a policy promotes
commerce and security of transactions. It is not unusual for two parties to con-
tract, and then for one party to see his expectations being frustrated or his an-
ticipated profits from the contract turned into losses. These are the risks of the
business world. There are exceptional cases, however, where a supervening
event occurs which completely destroys the value of the bargain. In these situa-
tions, a blind adherence to the pacta sunt servanda policy might lead to an in-
justice. Thus, courts can refuse to enforce a contract on the grounds that to
do so would be unjust or against public policy. One of the theoretical bases
for relieving parties of their duties under a contract is the doctrine of frustration
Sale" of a Business-I, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 623 (1960); Moore and Dohan, Sales, Churches,
and Monkeyshines, 11 TAx L. REv. 87 (1956); Comment, Taxation - Federal Income
Taxation - The Three-Party Sale and Lease-Back, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1140 (1963); Recent
Cases Show How Best To Sell a Business to a Tax-exempt Organization, 19 J. TAXATioN
302 (1963).
2 In .1950, Congress passed legislation in an attempt to deal with the tax advantages of
sales to charitable foundations with leaseback arrangements. This legislation now is contained
primarily in INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 514. It taxes as unrelated business income to the
exempt organization rentals received on leases over five years. Thus, by limiting leases to five
years, sale and leaseback plans do not fall within section 514 of the Code. See Commissioner
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 565-66 (1965); 19 J. TAXATioN 302 (1963).
3 Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 Cus. BULL. 128.
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of purpose.4 Frustration occurs when performance has become of little value
to the promisee. Although frustration is sometimes used synonymously with im-
possibility of performance, the two doctrines are conceptually distinct. Impossi-
bility of performance occurs when a promisor's own performance has become
impossible or extremely difficult.
Frustration of purpose is a doctrine of contract law of long but unsure
standing. The one consistent feature of the doctrine is the inconsistency with
which the courts have applied it.' The doctrine originated in the English corona-
tion cases." In the leading case of Henry v. Krell, a man hired an apartment
in order to view the coronation processions. When the processions were not held
due to the king's illness, the court held the lessee was released from his duty to
pay for the apartment. Although there was nothing about the purpose of the
transaction in the contract, the court found that the lessee rented the apartment
of these processions could not reasonably have been foreseen or provided for, and
that the nonhappening excused the lessee from the contract. This was the first
and leading case granting relief on the basis of frustration. Several months later,
however, the same court, in a similar situation, held the lessee liable for the rent.'
The leading American case dealing with the doctrine is Lloyd v. Murphy.9
In that case, the lessee had rented a piece of property in order to sell new auto-
mobiles on the site. The site could not be used for any other purpose without
the express consent of the lessor. Shortly thereafter, because of the war, the
federal government restricted the sale of new automobiles. The lessor waived
the restriction in the contract and gave the lessee permission to use the land for
other purposes. Despite the waiver, the lessee contended he was no longer obligated
under the lease because the purpose for which he entered the lease had been
frustrated by the governmental restriction. Justice Traynor, speaking for the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, held that the lessee was not excused from the lease.
Traynor failed to find that the lease was made totally valueless by the govern-
mental regulation. He also found that the lessee failed to prove that the pos-
4 The doctrine has been discussed extensively by legal periodicals. See, e.g., Anderson,
Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1953); Conlen,
The Doctrine of Frustration as Applied to Contracts, 70 U. PA. L. Rav. 87 "(1922); Patter-
son, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. Rav. 903 (1942); Rothschild,
The Doctrine of Frustration or Implied Condition in the Law of Contracts, 6 TEmp. L. Q.
337 (1932); Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58
COLUM. L. Rav. 287 (1958); Comment, Contracts -Frustration of Purpose, 59 MicH. L.
REv. 98 (1960); Comment, Impossibility and the Doctrine of Frustration of the Commercial
Object, 34 YAL 'L. J. 91 (1924).
5 Smit, supra note 4, at 309. Smit finds:
The conflict of authorities, apparently not reconcilable under any encom-
passing rationale, has stimulated the view that in every frustration case the court
weighs competing policies, determined by the facts of the individual case, instead
of applying a general doctrine covering all frustration cases. It offers little, if any,
assistance to commendable efforts to bring some certainty and predictability in this
area of the law.
6 Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493; Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
7 [1903] 2 K.B. 740. There was some confusion by the court between frustration of
purpose and impossibility of performance. One judge held that the case came within the
doctrine of Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B & S 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863), which was
decided on the basis of impossibility.
8 Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
9 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
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sibility of war and its consequences on the sale of automobiles were not fore-
seeable. Justice Traynor stated that the basic issue in frustration cases is
whether the equities of the case, considered in the light of sound public
policy, require placing the risk of a disruption or complete destruction of the
contract equilibrium on defendant or plaintiff under the circumstances of
a given case . . . and the answer depends on whether an unanticipated
circumstance, the risk of which should not be fairly thrown on the promisor,
has made performance vitally different from what was reasonably to be
expected.' °
Lloyd v. Murphy illustrates two characteristics common to many frustration
cases. About half of American frustration cases involve lease arrangements, and
one of the most frequent causes of frustration is unexpected governmental action
in the form of a statute or executive order that radically changes the basis of
the contract." As can be gleaned from the decision in Lloyd v. Murphy, ap-
parently the doctrine of frustration has won very little acceptance by American
courts. One commentator has classified it as a rejected doctrine. 2 Although
adopted by the Restatement of Contracts' and included under the term "im-
practicability" in the progressive Uniform Commercial Code,'4 it is almost with-
out support in case law.
However, in those few cases that have applied the doctrine, several re-
quisites are generally required. These requirements may be broken down into
the following: the value of the expected counterperformance must have been
10 Id. at 53-54, 153 P.2d at 50.
11 Comment, 59 MICH. L. Rav. 98, 99 (1960).
12 A careful search has uncovered no instance in which an American court of
last resort, in litigation involving a contract, has expressly followed the doctrine of
frustration in making its decision. The body of American case law from which
citations are made in support of the doctrine will be found on analysis to consist
of a few decisions of lower appellate courts, of numerous items of obiter dictum,
and of cases in which the opinion makes no mention of the doctrine. The other
side of the picture is that many decisions have been rendered by courts of last
resort in the last twenty years in which the doctrine was mentioned or discussed
but not followed. These statements will come as something new to many readers,
since legal literature gives the impression that the doctrine of frustration is an estab-
lished part of American law. Anderson, suprra note 4, at I. But see Smit, supra
note 4, at 307.
13 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 288 (1932), states:
Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained by
either party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and
this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a promisor who is without fault
in causing the frustration, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty
of performing his promise unless a contrary intention appears.
It appears that there was no discussion on this section before any annual meeting of the
American Law Institute. Apparently the provision was drafted by Reporter Samuel Williston
and inserted in a catch-all draft passed just minutes before the final adoption of the Restate-
ment. Anderson, supra note 4, at 8.
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615. Comment I to this section states that a seller
will be excused "from timely delivery of goods contracted for, where his performance has
become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting." (Emphasis added.) Com-
ment 3 states that the test of "commercial impracticability (as contrasted with 'impossibility,'
'frustration of performance' or 'frustration of the venture') has been adopted in order to
call attention to the commercial character of the criterion chosen by this Article." 'For a
good discussion of the Code provisions concerning commercial impracticability, see The Uni-




rendered practically worthless; the frustrating event must not have been fore-
seeable and assumed; the purpose of the frustrated party in making the con-
tract must have been known to both parties when the contract was made;
and the contract must be executory. 5 When applying the doctrine of frustration,
courts have used various rationales. Among the rationales most frequently em-
ployed are failure of consideration,"0 basic assumption," implied conditions, 8
and gap-filling. 9 However, whatever rationales are used by the courts in frustra-
tion cases, it appears that they are mere attempts to frame their decisions in some
legally accepted language. As one commentator has stated:
[I]n the final analysis, the entire problem of fixing the limits within
which parties, who have not expressly stated them, shall be excused from
performance, is not solely one of theoretical concept, nor of logical deduction,
but more so, perhaps, than we care to articulate, one of public policy.20
In the final analysis, the court in Mayer seems to have done just that.
Mayer differs from other frustration cases by its peculiar fact situation. As
exemplified by Lloyd v. Murphy,21 many frustration and impossibility cases in-
volve executive orders. Mayer, however, raises for the first time the important
15 See generally Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); SIMPSON, CoN-
TRACTS § 182 (2d ed. 1965); Comment, 59 MICH. L. Rav. 98, 99-100 (1960).
16 Justice Traynor stated: "Performance remains possible but the expected value of
performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by a fortuitous event, which
supervenes to cause an actual but not literal failure of consideration . " Lloyd v. Murphy,
25 Cal. 2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).
17 Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y. Supp.
179 (1915). The basic assumption test is recognized by both RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 288 (1932) and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615.
18 E.g., Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741
(1945), where the court said: "Whether you call it impossibility of performance or frustra-
tion, the result is the same. In either event the court will imply a condition excusing both
parties from performance . . . ."; 119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123,
125, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (Sup. Ct. 1947), a'd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430
(1949), where the Court said:
The doctrine is based upon the theory of an implied term which the law
imputes to the parties in order to regulate a situation which, in the eyes of the
law, the parties themselves would have regulated by agreement if the necessity had
occurred to them ....
Dorsey v. Oregon Motor Stages, 183 Or. 494, 194 P.2d 967, 971 (1948), where the Oregon
Supreme Court stated that the English doctrine of "commercial frustration" and the Ameri-
can doctrine of "supervening impossibility of performance" read into the contract, "in the
absence of repellent circumstances, an implied condition that the promisor shall be absolved
from performance" if a supervening event for which neither party is responsible frustrates
the purpose intended to be gained by the promisor. See also Patterson, supra note 4.
19 West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 718 (1967), follows the gap-filling rationale. In its decision
in Mayer, the Ninth Circuit cites as authority Smit, supra note 4, at 314. Smit argues that
a frustration problem may arise even where the subsequent events were foreseen.
Unforeseeability ordinarily establishes that a promisor cannot reasonably be pre-
sumed to have assumed the risk of occurrence of the unforeseen circumstances.
However, the applicability of the gap filling doctrine ultimately hinges on whether
or not proper interpretation of the contract shows that the risk of the subsequent
events, whether or not foreseen, was assumed by the promisor. If it appears from
the nature of the contract as well as from the surrounding circumstances that,
although they were reasonably foreseeable, the promisor did not assume the risk
of the subsequent events, the contract shows a gap subject to supplementation in
accordance with rules of objective law.
20 Rothschild, supra note 4, at 338.
21 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
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question of whether a tax ruling should be held to have the same effect as a
statute or executive order in frustration and impossibility cases. The Ninth
Circuit has answered in the affirmative.
Although Mayer was framed in terms of frustration, the case is not really
an appropriate one for applying the doctrine. Only two of the four conditions gen-
erally required were clearly met. The district court found that the purpose of
the frustrated party was known by both parties when the contract was made,22
and that since only part of the payments had been made, the contract was still
executory. However, there is reason to question whether the most important
conditions of frustration existed in Mayer. The consideration promised to Mayer
did not become wholly valueless by the supervening tax ruling, and there is some
evidence that the possibility of an adverse tax ruling was not unforeseeable.23
Since the operating company could still continue to deduct the full eighty percent
rental payments for tax purposes, the transaction was not rendered totally value-
less. The real problems were that the Institute was being taxed on the rentals,
and the Mayers were not being accorded capital gain treatment. There was,
however, a default provision in the contract. The arrangement, secured by
chattel and real property mortgages on the sold properties, would be in default if
specified minimum payments were not met. Even if they could have invoked
the default clause, the Mayers would not have wanted to as it did not provide
for an immediate return of the properties.2 4 Moreover, the Institute offered to
pay the Mayers the remainder of the purchase price after the court action had
begun. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held this concession would not satisfy
the contractual purpose of the Mayers.
In addition to the question whether the contract was rendered valueless,
there is sufficient reason to question whether an adverse tax ruling was not fore-
seeable. The parties actually discussed failure of the tax advantages in their
negotiations preceding the contract, and the Institute's representative orally
promised to return the properties if the tax benefits became ineffective. 5 In
finding that the parties did not foresee the possibility of the tax ruling, the district
court gave a very restricted meaning to the word "foreseeable." To be sure, the
district court's interpretation of foreseeability does not conform to the view of
foreseeability taken by Justice Traynor in Lloyd v. Murphy.26 Traynor had
argued that the party who claimed frustration of the contract entered into on
August 4, 1941, had failed to prove that a war was not foreseeable."
Despite the arguments that the contract still remained valuable to both
parties and that the parties contracted with reference to the possibility of an
adverse tax ruling, the district court and the Ninth Circuit nonetheless allowed
the contract to be rescinded and the properties returned on the basis of frustra-
tion. The Ninth Circuit found that the revenue ruling made it impossible for
the operating company to make the contemplated payments to the Institute.
22 West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225-26




26 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
27 Id. at 55-56, 153 P.2d at 51.
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The court held the tax consequences which were denied by the ruling were
"the keystone of the plan, without which it was wholly unfeasible and would
never have been seriously considered"2 by the Mayers. The Institute's offer to
pay the remainder of the purchase price after the court action had begun, like-
wise was held not to satisfy the contract. "The consideration bargained for by
the sellers was not merely $2,500,000 but $2,500,000 recognized by the IRS
as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset and entitled to capital gain treat-
ment.
2
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner
v. Brown had no bearing on the case. Brown involved a sale and leaseback
arrangement similar to the one in Mayer. The Supreme Court in Brown de-
dared the sellers were entitled to capital gain treatment. Brown, however, which
was decided in 1965, still lay in the future when the parties entered into their con-
tract in 1951, the tax benefits of which were frustrated by the 1954 revenue
ruling.
The Ninth Circuit's statement that the "now more widely accepted view"
is that "foreseeability of the frustrating event is not alone enough to bar rescission
if it appears that the parties did not intend the promisor to assume the risk of
its occurrence"' is open to dispute. This statement is in direct conflict with
Justice Traynor's language in Lloyd v. Murphy.2 In support of its position the
Ninth Circuit cited scant authority-" Once the court had accepted this view
as law, by admitting testimony surrounding the making of the contract, it was
a simple matter to conclude that the Mayers did not assume the risk of an
adverse ruling. 4
The admission of testimony surrounding the formation of the contract
brought into question the parol evidence rule. One of the chief criticisms of the
doctrine of frustration is that it violates the parol evidence rule. 5 This rule
provides that oral agreements prior to, or contemporaneous with, an integrated
written contract cannot be admitted to vary or add to the terms of the contract.2 6
The rule is intended to secure finality and certainty in contractual rights and
duties under a written contract. It was early recognized in frustration cases that
the parol evidence rule was no bar to admitting oral evidence for the purpose
of ascertaining the intent of the parties to a written contract." In admitting
28 West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 223 (9th
Cir. 1966), 87 Sup. Ct. 718 (1967).
29 Id. at 224.
30 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
31 West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225 (9th
Cir. 1966), 87 Sup. Ct. 718 (1967).
32 The courts have required a promisor seeking to excuse himself from performance
of his obligations to prove that the risk of the frustrating event was not reasonably
foreseeable and that the value of counterperformance is totally or nearly totally
destroyed, for frustration is no defense if it was foreseeable or controllable by the
proinisor, or if counterperformance remains valuable. 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d
47, 50 (1944).
33 West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225 (9th
Cir. 1966), 87 Sup. Ct. 718 (1967).
34 Id. at 225-26.
35 Comment, 59 MicH. L. Rav. 98, 109 (1960).
36 SiMPsoNr, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 98.
37 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 754.
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parol evidence in frustration cases, courts are not actually varying or adding to
the contract. Rather they are trying to effectuate the intent of the parties.
In Mayer, the purpose of the frustrated party was not expressed in the con-
tract. A supervening event, unprovided for in the contract, entirely changed
the complexion of the agreement. Thus, in order to make a fair ruling, it was
necessary for the court to obtain all the facts possible surrounding the making
of the contract. The Institute strenuously objected to the admission of the oral
agreement between Mayer and the Institute's representatives. *" The evidence
revealed that Mayer was concerned that the contemplated tax advantages might
fail, and he thus desired a provision in the contract providing for return of the
properties should such an event occur. However, he was persuaded by his
lawyers and the Institute's representatives that such a provision might taint the
bona fides of the plan and result in an adverse tax ruling. Mayer thereupon
demanded and received an oral promise from the Institute's representative that
if the tax advantages failed, the properties would be returned and the contract
cancelled." In this case, the admission of oral evidence of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction was correct. The statute dealing with parol evidence
in Oregon (the jurisdiction in which Mayer arose) specifically provides that parol
evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties to an instrument and
the circumstances under which it was made, even where the instrument is un-
ambiguous.4 0
The key to the court's decision in Mayer may well lie in the intricacies and
subtleties of tax law. Although tax rulings are appealable, and although it might
be argued that a ruling is not totally frustrating, a party should not have 'to
resort to a lawsuit. Also, it was the very delicate nature of the tax world that
prompted the parties not to insert an exculpatory or saving clause into the
written contract. Failure to include reference to the tax consequences did not
necessarily mean that the parties were guilty of fraud. The United States
Supreme Court has stated, "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount
of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which
the law permits, cannot be doubted."'"
38 West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 226-27 n.10
'(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 718 (1967).
39 Ibid.
40 After stating that no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents
of the writing may be received, ORE. REv. STAT. § 41.740 (1963) proceeds: "However this
section does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was
made, or to which it relates, as defined in ORS 42.220 .... " ORE. Rav. STAT. § 42.220
(1965) provides:
In construing an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject and of the parties, may be shown so that the
judge is placed in the position of those whose language he is interpreting.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Card v. Stirnweis, 232 Or. 123, 374 P.2d 472 (1962), inter-
preted ORE. Rav. STAT. § 42.220 (1965) as allowing parol evidence admissible to show the
situation of the parties to an instrument and the circumstances under which it was made.
41 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). In Stone v. Stone, 319 Mich. 194,
29 N.W.2d 271 (1947), a case analogous to Mayer, the parties were not denied relief because
of their attempt to minimize taxes. A father had transferred part of the family business to
his two minor children under a mistaken belief that income accruing to the children could
be separately returned. However, when his plan failed as a result of a subsequent Supreme
Court decision, he was granted relief on the basis of mutual mistake. In Stone, there was no
sale, but rather a gift.
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The result in Mayer, if interpreted correctly and in light of the peculiar
facts of the case, is not bad law. In view of the difficulty in obtaining tax
advisory opinions in advance, and of the complexity of the tax world, a safety
valve is needed where a contract is founded upon presumed tax advantages.
Mayer has found such a safety valve in the doctrine of frustration of purpose.
By applying the doctrine of frustration, the Ninth Circuit actually succeeded
in giving effect to the oral promise to return the property. Although it may be
argued that the decision in Mayer is a distortion and liberal extension of the
frustration doctrine, there is nothing unusual in liberally interpreting a legal
doctrine to do justice.
Charles Weiss
CONFLICT OF LAWS - TORTS - WHAT THE COURT CONSIDERS To BE
THE BETTER RULE OF LAW Is A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN CHOOSING WHICH
STATE LAW To APPLY. - On the evening of June 26, 1964, Mr. and Mrs.
Albert Clark left their home in Lancaster, New Hampshire, for an automobile
trip to Littleton, New Hampshire, intending to return home later that same
evening. The trip took the Clarks into Vermont where they were involved in
an automobile accident. Mrs. Clark brought a suit for damages against her
husband in a Superior Court of New Hampshire alleging that her injuries re-
sulted from her husband's negligence in operating the autoniobile. Vermont,
the state in which the accident occurred, has a guest statute under which a host
is liable to his automobile guest only if the injuries were caused by the operator's
"gross or wilful negligence."1 In New Hampshire, however, which has no such
statute, a guest may recover if his injuries resulted from his host's lack of ordinary
care.2 The plaintiff moved for a pre-trial order that the substantive law of
New Hampshire should govern. The question as to which state law was to
apply was transferred without a ruling to the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire. That court, on the pre-trial order, held: where there were no counter-
vailing policy considerations which would require the application of Vermont
law, the court should apply the better rule of law. The court concluded that
New Hampshire law was preferable to that of Vermont and should, therefore,
govern. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966).
The real significance of Clark lies not in its holding, but in its language.
The significance of this language can be seen from an examination of the torts-
conflict of law development over the last forty years. Until recent times, the
general rule of law that was almost universally applied in any tort-conflicts
situation was that the substantive law of the place of injury rather than that
1 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (1959) provides:
The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable in damages for in-
juries received by any occupant of the same occasioned by reason of the operation bf
such vehicle unless such owner or operator has received or contracted to receive pay
for the carriage of such occupant, or unless such injuries are caused by the gross or
wilful negligence of the operator.
2 Sullivan v. LeBlanc, 100 N.H. 311, 125 A.2d 652 (1956); Smith v. Babb, 91 N.H. 472,
22 A.2d 330 (1941); Mooney v. Chapdelaine, 90 N.H. 415, 10 A.2d 220 (1939), aff'd, 90
N.H. 415, 11 A.2d 713 (1940).
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of the forum state was to be applied Thus, in tort litigation, the situs state's
laws concerning various rights, duties, privileges, and immunities that are
substantive in nature were applied by courts in the forum state. However, the
forum continued to apply its own procedural laws. The difference between
substance and procedure has never been clear, and thus the application of the
substantive-procedural dichotomy has not always been easy. This rule concern-
ing the application of the situs state's substantive laws was adopted in the Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, section 378: "The law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."
The Restatement choice of law rule has had significant impact in automo-
bile accident litigation. This is especially true in view of the adoption of auto-
mobile guest statutes in many jurisdictions. Thus, in situations similar to that
present in Clark, a plaintiff suing in a jurisdiction which has no guest statute
cannot recover on a showing of ordinary negligence if the situs state has such
a statute.4 Moreover, under this rule, the forum state would have to recognize
a defense granted by the situs even if the forum allowed no such defense. One
such defense, important in automobile accident litigation, is immunity from
suit. Personal injury actions are frequently affected by the fact that at least one
of the parties involved is a member of the same family. At common law there
could be no tort action between husband and wife.5 Although this immunity
doctrine has been the subject of much criticism and has been rejected in a
number of jurisdictions,6 the continued vitality of the doctrine has had important
ramifications in the conflict of law area. If, for some reason, the situs state
granted certain immunity from suit and the forum state did not, courts in the
forum state would have to recognize the situs' immunity and deny recovery.'
Thus, a husband-defendant who would be immune from suit in the situs state
could not be sued in any other state.'
The Restatement choice of law rule has certain advantages. Foremost
3 For a concise history of this rule, see EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 541-48 (1962).
For a thorough treatment of the application of this rule in torts, see generally 2 BEALE, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 1286-1305 (1935).
4 In Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 576, 158 S.E. 101, 102 (1931), the court stated:
The actionable quality of the defendant's conduct in inflicting injury upon the
plaintiff must be determined by the law of the place where the injury was done; that
is, the measure of the defendant's duty and his liability for negligence must be deter-
mined by the law of New Jersey [the situs state] .... If an act does not give rise to
a cause of action where it is committed the general rule is that the party who com-
mits the act will not be liable elsewhere ....
5 PROSSER, TORTS 880 (3d ed. 1964).
6 Id. at 884-85.
7 In Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 15, 138 So. 414, 415 (1931), the court stated:
The question is, Can the wife maintain an action in tort committed in Mississip-
pi against her husband in the courts of Alabama for which she could not recover
under the laws of Mississippi notwithstanding she could do so in Alabama, the parties
being citizens of Alabama, when the injury occurred or the tort was committed in the
state of Mississippi?
It is well settled by the decisions of this court that, where an accident occurs in
another state, the courts of this state will look to the substantive law of that state to
determine whether the defendant under that law has breached any legal duty to the
plaintiff.
8 The converse was not always true. In situations where the situs state did not grant
immunity, but the forum state did, the courts applied the forum law and thus granted im-
munity. The reasons given were "public policy." Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286
N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941); Mertz v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Poling v. Poling, 116 W.Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
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among these is its ease of application. Courts simply have to look to the laws
of the situs state and apply them. This, no doubt, accounts for the rule's long
heritage. Until recent years, it was applied in automobile cases as a well-accepted
rule of law. Courts generally stated that the rule was "well settled" or "not
seriously in dispute' 9 and applied it mechanically, without advancing any policy
reasons in its support.
Although Connecticut,"0 Illinois," and North Carolina 2 have applied the
law of the situs state rule in recent automobile litigation, the Restatement rule
does not represent the progressive trend of today's conflicts law. The Restate-
ment choice of law rule has become "'almost completely discredited as an un-
varying guide!'" in present-day tort litigation. One of the main causes for such
judicial disfavor with the old rule is that courts, in applying this rule, are forced
to give effect to the public policy of another state even if such policy is in con-
tradiction to that of their own state. This situation became most critical in
automobile litigation because of the increasing number of accidents occurring
outside the state in which the suit is brought. Thus, courts had a strong motive
for changing or deviating from the Restatement. A number of theories were
devised to circumvent the rule.
One of the earliest attempts to avoid application of this outmoded rule
came in 1928 in Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co. 4 In that case
the defendant, a Connecticut corporation, rented one of its automobiles to a
Mr. Sack. The plaintiff, a guest in the rented car driven by Sack, was injured
as a result of his host's negligence. The accident occurred in Massachusetts
and suit was filed in Connecticut. Connecticut had a statute rendering any
person who rented any vehicle strictly liable for any damage caused by the
operation of the rented vehicle;' 5 Massachusetts had no such statute. Thus,
the liability of the defendant corporation could be predicated only on its negli-
gence in renting the car. Since negligence could not be shown, a rigid applica-
tion of the Restatement rule would have meant that the Connecticut court
would have had to apply the law of the place of the accident, or Massachusetts
law, which would have negated any liability. However, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, in holding the defendant liable, reasoned that the Connecticut
statute was imposed upon the contract by law, and the contract remained the
same in every state. It thus predicated the defendant's liability on a contractual
rather than a tort basis.
This reasoning was not followed by courts until almost thirty years later.
9 See, e.g., Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 15, 138 So. 414, 415 (1931); Buckeye v.
Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
10 Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966).
11 Hyatt v. Cox, 57 II. App. 2d 293, 206 N.E.2d 260 (1965). This case, however, has
been modified by Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966). Hyatt held that
the substantive law of the situs state applies and followed Opp v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 128 N.E.
580 (1920), in this respect. Wartell held that the forum state's immunity statute applied rather
than that of the situs state. However, Wartell made no attempt to overrule Opp or Hyatt.
12 Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
13 Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (N.H. 1966).
14 108 Conn. 333, 143 AUt. 163 '(1928).
15 The statute provided: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle
owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation
of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased." Public Acts of Conn. 1925, ch. 195, § 21.
16 108 Conn. 333, 337-38, 143 Ad. 163, 164-65 (1928).
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In 1955, the Supreme Court of California handed down the landmark opinion
of Emery v. Emery." In that case, the Emery family, domiciled in the state
of California, were involved in an automobile accident in Idaho caused by the
negligence of their unemancipated minor son. One of the Emery children, who
was injured in the accident, brought suit in California against her brother as
tortfeasor and her father as owner of the vehicle. A preliminary question before
the court was whether the immunities granted by California law or those granted
by Idaho law should be applied. An application of the Restatement rule would
have meant that the California court had to recognize the immunities granted
by Idaho law. However, the court held that the suit involved family relations
more than mere tort relations and hence California law should govern. The
court stated:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a
family relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law
of the state of the family domicile. That state has the primary responsibility
for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family relationship and it
is the only state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative
processes, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable
that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed
by the family relationship should constantly change as members of the
family cross state boundaries during temporary absences from their home
Since all of the parties to the present case are apparently domiciliaries of
California, we must look to the law of this state to determine whether any
disabilities or immunities exist.' s
This statement represented a significant change in the law. Emery was the first
opinion to refuse to apply the immunities granted by the situs state on the basis
that the suit involved family relations more than tort relations. This is quite
significant in view of the number of automobile accident cases that involve
members of the same family as adverse parties. Thus, Emery was a major inroad
upon the Restatement rule.
Four years later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin handed down another
landmark decision, Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.9 The facts in Haum-
schild represented the familiar conflicts of law pattern. The parties were domi-
ciled in Wisconsin and were involved in an automobile accident in California.
Under Wisconsin law, the wife could sue her husband for his negligence in
causing the accident; under California law, the husband was immune from
such a suit. The Wisconsin court, in refusing to apply the law of the situs, stated:
We are convinced that, from both the standpoint of public policy and
logic, the proper solution of the conflict of laws problem, in cases similar
to the instant action, is to hold that the law of the domicile is the one that
ought to be applied in determining any issue of incapacity to sue based
upon family relationshipY9
17 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
18 Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.
19 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
20 95 N.W.2d at 818.
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The court stated that immunity was derived from the common law idea of the
unity of husband and wife, and held that there was no longer any reason for
granting such immunity to the husband."
The absurdity of the Restatement rule was clearly pointed out in Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.2 In that case, plaintiff's decedent bought an air-
plane ticket in New York City for a flight to Boston. The plane crashed in
Massachusetts killing a number of passengers, including plaintiff's decedent.
The plaintiff filed suit in New York against the defendant airline for the wrong-
ful death of his decedent. This case involved a direct conflict between the New
York State Constitution and a Massachusetts statute. The New:York Constitu-
tion provides that there shall be no statutory limit on the amount of recovery in
a wrongful death action.2" The Massachusetts statute limited the amount re-
coverable on such an action to a maximum of $15,000.24 Thus, an application
of the Restatement rule would have limited the amount of recovery to $15,000
in spite of the New York Constitution. The New York Court of Appeals, how-
ever, refused to follow the limitations imposed by the Massachusetts statute and
instead applied the New York law. The court stated: "Modem conditions make
it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen of this State to the
varying laws of other States through and over which they [sic] move.... The
place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous."2
Two years after Kilberg, the New York Court of Appeals decided Babcock
v. Jackson,6 which involved a defendant-host and a plaintiff-guest, both resi-
dents of New York. The accident occurred while the parties were driving in
Ontario, Canada. New York had no. guest statute. Ontario had a very harsh
21 Id. at 817. Haumschild expressly overruled Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W.
342 (1931), which applied the immunities granted by the situs state. Id. at 818.
22 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
23 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16.
24 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1955) provided:
If the proprietor of a common carrier of passengers, ... by reason of his or its
negligence .. .causes the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in damages in
the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars, to be
assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or of his or its
servants or agents ....
This statute has subsequently been amended to raise the minimum and maximum amounts
recoverable to $5,000 and $50,000 respectively for accidents occurring after January 1, 1966.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1965).
25 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 135 (1961). The holding in Kilberg was challenged as violating the "full faith and credit"
clause of art. IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 '(1963). That case involved another
decedent in the same airplane crash as in Kilberg. The defendant Airlines argued that the New
York court was not necessarily required to give any faith or credit to the Massachusetts law.
However, the defendant argued further that once the New York Court gives some faith and
credit to the Massachusetts law (in this case the right to maintain an action in New York
under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute) then it must give full credit to the limita-
tions imposed by that same law. This argument was expressly rejected by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, in Pearson. The court in Pearson
held that the holding in Kilberg did not violate the federal constitution. 309 F.2d at 557. For
a treatment of a choice of law which did violate the full faith and credit clause, see First
Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951). For a thorough treatment of this subject, see generally Currie, The Constitution and
the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the judicial Function, 26 U. CEx. L. REv. 9
(1958).
26 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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guest statute, which completely precluded recovery by any injured guest." The
court, in refusing to apply the Ontario guest statute, reasoned that Ontario had
no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against his
New York host merely because the accident occurred in Ontario. The court
stated:
Although the rightness or wrongness of defendant's conduct may depend
upon the law of the particular jurisdiction through which the automobile
passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties which stem from their guest-
host relationship should remain constant and not vary and shift as the
automobile proceeds from place to place.28
When the American Law Institute met recently to draft a new Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, decisions such as Babcock, Kilberg, Haumschild, and Emery
caused the ALI to revise its choice of law rule. Thus, the Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws, section 379, Tentative Draft No. 9 provides:
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relation-
ship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and
liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining
the state of most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum
will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes
of the tort rules of the interested states.
The significant change which has taken place in choice of law over the past
twelve years can thus be readily seen.29
Moreover, courts have not confined this expansion to the new idea embodied
27 ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 172, § 105'(2) (1960) provides:
[Mhe owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the
business of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage
resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in . . . the
motor vehicle.
28 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751
(1963).
29 The doctrine of the most significant relationship has been incorporated into a number
of cases. See, e.g., Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Service, Inc., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965);
Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d
421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 '(1966); Baits
v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141
N.W.2d 526 (1966); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957);
Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216
A.2d 781 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Wilson v.
Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958); Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d
34 (1958); Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 28; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d
34, 172 N.E. 2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa- 86, 215 A.2d
677 (1966); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7
Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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in the tentative draft of the Restatement (Second). In 1965, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in Wilcox v. Wilcox,"0 adopted the position of the new
Restatement draft and went a step beyond it. The court, after stating that the
order of the various factors in the Restatement would not be determinative of the
weight given to those factors, made the following interesting statement: "[T]he
law of the forum should presumptively apply unless it becomes clear that non-
forum contacts are of the greater significance."'" The tentative draft of the
Restatement (Second) makes no mention of presumptions. Under Wilcox,
Wisconsin courts will henceforth presumptively apply the forum law, whereas
under the Restatement (Second) they would have had to first inquire into
which state had the most significant relationship to the events and the parties
involved.
In Clark, however, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire made no men-
tion of any presumption as to which law would be applied. The court did,
however, list five factors important in determining the proper choice of law.
These factors were predictability of results; maintenance of reasonable orderli-
ness and good relationship among the states in our federal system; simplification
of the judicial task; the advancement of the forum's own governmental interests;
and finally, the court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of
law. 2 In arriving at its decision, the court focused primarily on the last factor,
namely its preference for what it considered to be the sounder rule of law. The
court stated:
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases .... If the law
of some other state is outmoded, an unrepealed remnant of a bygone age,
"a drag on the coattails of civilization," . . . we will try to see our way clear
to apply our own law instead. If it is our own law that is obsolete or
senseless (and it could be) we will try to apply the other state's law.
(Emphasis added:) 3 3
This language is much broader than that used by the court in Wilcox. The
court in Clark made it clear that it would apply the better rule of law whether
the law be that of the forum state or that of the situs.
If the court's language in Clark were followed in future cases, many prob-
lems could arise in attempting to determine which is the "better" rule of law.
There is a great diversity in the laws of the several states in numerous areas.
For example, there is no unanimity of opinion among the states as to the pro-
cedural effects of res ipsa loquitur. Some states say that certain facts and cir-
cumstances allow a presumption of negligence, whereas others allow only an
inference of negligence? * Another problem is the division among the various
states as to who has the burden of proof for the defense of contributory negli-
gence. Some states place the burden on the plaintiff to show freedom from
30 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
31 133 N.W.2d at 416.
32 Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 208-209 (N.H. 1966). These five factors were previously
stated in Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 267
(1966).
33 Clark v. Clark, supra note 32, at 209.
34 For a breakdown of the states' holdings in regard to the procedural effects of res ipsa
loquitur, see PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 232-39.
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contributory negligence, whereas other states place the burden of proof on the
defendant who asserts this defense." Moreover, as has been shown above, there
is often a conflict among the states as to various immunities and limitations on
the amount of recovery. Who is to say which is the better rule of law? Courts
in the past have usually applied the forum law in regard to the doctrines of
res ipsa loquitur5 and contributory negligence.3" Under the language of Clark,
however, the procedural laws of the forum need not be applied if the court
does not think that they are the better rules of law. The court in Clark made
this express point when it stated: "If it is our own law that is obsolete or sense-
less (and it could be) we will try to apply the other state's law."'
A problem will also arise in the federal courts. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co.,"9 the United States Supreme Court held that under the Erie
doctrine a federal court in a diversity action must apply the conflict of laws
doctrine of the state in which the federal court is located. Thus, in a state which
follows the language of Clark, a federal court when faced with a choice of law
problem must decide which is the better rule of law. In the absence of any
guides from the state supreme court, the federal court will have to decide on
its own what it considers the better rule of law.
The court's statement in Clark will also create serious problems concernng
the predictability of results. It will be very difficult for a lawyer to advise his
client on the feasibility of litigation since he will have to guess what the court
will think the better rule of law to be. As has been noted above, this will not
always be an easy task. The court in Clark recognized that problems would
arise in the future when it stated:
This case is a comparatively easy one, and in cases like it the result will
hereafter be reasonably easy for lawyers and trial judges to calculate.
Admittedly there will be harder cases, more difficult to decide, cases that
will not yield sure answers in terms of proper choice-influencing considera-
tions as readily as this case does. That will not be a new phenomenon
in conflict of laws. Nor will it be as bad as choice based on mechanical
rules which do not take the relevant considerations into account. In course
of time perhaps we will develop "principles of preference" based upon the
relevant considerations, to guide us more exactly.4
0
It is submitted that the precise holding in Clark was clearly just. Guest
35 See, id. at 426.
36 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dis-
missed, United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951; Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir, 1959); Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952); Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439
(E.D. Pa. 1960); Chasse v. Albert, 147 Conn. 680, 166 A.2d 148 '(1960); Hutchins v. Rock
Creek Ginger Ale Co., 194 A.2d 305 (D.C. App. 1963); Leventhal v. American Airlines, Inc.,
347 Mass. 766, 196 N.E.2d 924 (1964); Stevens v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 355 S.W.2d 122
(Mo. 1962); Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 194, 247 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Capital Airlines, Inc. v. Barger, 341 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. App. 1960).
37 Alexander v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 273 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1959); Sampson
v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Waite v. Krug
Baking Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 382, 136 A.2d 347 (1957); Gregory v. Maine Central R. Co.,
317 Mass. 636, 59 N.E.2d 471 (1945); Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919).
38 Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966).
39 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
40 Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (N.H. 1966).
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statutes have been outmoded for a considerable length of time. Many writers
have criticized them.4' However, the language of the court will lead to ques-
tionable results. It will take a: long time to build up the body of precedent which
is required for judicial stability. Until that time, there will be little predictability
in the law. The Wisconsin court's statement in Wilcox that the court will pre-
sumptively apply the law of the forum has the virtue of. giving the courts a
more definite standard to follow. Under this doctrine, lawyers are apprised
that the forum law will be applied unless the other state's contacts "are of the
greater significance."" Such a statement, if made in Clark, would have achieved
the same result and would have had the added virtue of insuring more stability
and certainty. These are no small virtues. Although the court's decision in
Clark may have meant greater justice in the instant case, it is to be hoped that
immediate justice was not purchased at the price of future instability and
uncertainty in the law.
William T. Coleman
CRIMINAL LAWr-HABEAS CORPUS -RIGHT' TO TREATMENT OF A PER-
SON INVOLUNTARILY COMMITrED -TO A MENTAL HOSPITAL AFTER BEING
ACQUITTED OF AN OFFENSE' BY REASON OF INSANITY IS COGNIZABLE IN
HABEAS CORPUS. - Charles Rouse was involuntarily committed to Saint Eliza-
beths Hospital' by the Municipal Court, now the Court of General Sessions, of
the District of Columbia. He had been found not guilty, by reason of insanity,
of carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor for which the maximum im-
prisonment is one year.2 After four years of confinement, Rouse brought habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia attack-
ing his incarceration. Rouse contended, among other things, that he was receiv-
ing no psychiatric treatment. The district court refused to consider the alleged
lack of treatment and denied habeas corpus relief. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Danaher, J. dissenting, remanded and
held: law and justice require that we remand for a hearing, and findings -on
whether appellant is receiving adequate treatment, and if not, the details and
circumstances underlying the reason why he is not, the latter information being
essential to determine whether there is "an overwhelmingly compelling reason"
for the failure to provide adequate treatment. Rouse v. Cameron, No. 19863,
D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1966.
41 See, e.g., PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 190-91; Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle
Automobile Indemnity Companies? 61 AM. L. REv. 77 (1927); Gibson, Let's Abolish Guest
Passenger Legislation, 35 MAN. B. NEWS 274 (1965); Kripke, Should Colorado Retain the
"Guest Statute"?-Public Policy v. Insurance Policy, 35 DicTA 179 (1958); Pedrick, Taken for
a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 90 (1961); Weinstein,
Should We Kill the Guest Passenger Act? 33 DET. LAW. 185 (1965); White, The Liability of
an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REv. 326 '(1934).
42 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (1965).
1 D.C. CODE § 24-301 (d) (1961) provides:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense . . . is
acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission,
the court shall order such person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill.
2 D.C. CODE § 22-3215 (1961).
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In a companion case, decided on the same day as Rouse, the petitioner was
attacking his involuntary confinement in Saint Elizabeths Hospital as a "sexual
psychopath."3 He appealed from a denial of his habeas corpus petition on the
grounds that the district court erred, among other things, in failing to find that
the absence of psychiatric treatment in the hospital required relief. In granting
sexual psychopaths a right to relief upon a showing that they are not receiving
reasonably suitable and adequate treatment, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held: the district court must inquire into petitioner's
allegations of lack of treatment in accordance with the standards and proce-
dures set forth in Rouse v. Cameron. Millard v. Cameron, No. 19584, D.C.
Cir., Oct. 10, 1966.
Judge David Bazelon, author of the controversial Durham Rule,
4
has again broken new ground in the medico-legal field by his finding in Rouse
that persons involuntarily committed to mental hospitals after being acquitted
of an offense by reason of insanity have a right to treatment that is cognizable
in habeas corpus. After discussing several theories under which the right to
treatment could be supported on constitutional grounds, Judge Bazelon went
on to base the right on the 1964: Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act.' Hav-
ing developed the right to treatment with relative ease, the remaining part of
the opinion was devoted to providing the proper means and standards for imple-
menting the right.
There is some question as to whether the 1964 Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Ill Act was ever intended to apply to persons committed by order of a
court in a criminal proceeding, because the statutory definition of mental illness
seems to exclude such persons.e Nevertheless, the right to treatment is plain.
Even the dissenting judge recognized this in saying, "No member of this court
has ever suggested that a person committed because of mental illness should not
receive 'treatment.' "" It would seem that Judge Bazelon for the majority was
content to base the right to treatment on the questionable application of the
1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act because it allowed him to avoid
the serious constitutional questions presented by a denial of the right to treat-
ment." It is submitted, however, that the United States Court of Appeals for
3 D.C. Coim §§ 22-3503-09 (1961) contain provisions for the involuntary commitment
to Saint Elizabeths Hospital of all persons, who though not insane, fall within the statutory
definition of "sexual psychopath."
4 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Here the famous
M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests of criminal responsibility were rejected in the
District of Columbia in favor of the so-called Durham Rule that an accused is not crim-
inally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect.
5 D.C. CODE § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966) provides:
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. The
administrator of each public hospital shall keep records detailing all medical and
psychiatric care and treatment received by a person hospitalized for a mental illness
and the records shall be made available, upon that person's written authorization,
to his attorney or personal physician.
6 Rouse v. Cameron, No. 19,863, D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1966, at 28-29 n.12. (dissenting
opinion).7 id. at 28. (dissenting opinion). It is important to note that judge Danaher's dissent
was confined almost entirely to his contention that the court was deciding a case which was
not before it, viz., that Rouse had contended on his pleadings and at trial that he was not insane
and needed no treatment, not that he was being deprived of treatment. Id. at 20.
8 Id. at 6. (majority opinion).
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the District of Columbia recognizes that the right to treatment is constitutionally
compelled, and that they would be willing to place it on strong constitutional
grounds if necessary.
The purpose of involuntary hospitalization after acquittal by reason of
insanity is treatment rather than punishment.9 "It has two purposes: (1) to
protect the public and the subject; (2) to afford a place and a procedure to
rehabilitate and restore the subject . . .... 'o "Sickness of the individual and
his need of treatment or care is the only justification for using 'likelihood of
dangerousness' as a basis for deprivation of liberty."'" As was said of the District
of Columbia statute, "[Tlhis mandatory commitment provision rests upon a
supposition, namely, the necessity for treatment of the mental condition which
led to the acquittal by reason of insanity. And this necessity for treatment pre-
supposes in turn that treatment will be accorded."" Since the only justification
for involuntary hospitalization of one not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity
is therapeutic, the conclusion is inescapable that one so incarcerated who receives
no treatment is being deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
"Our present policy of indefinitely involuntarily institutionalizing our men-
tally ill in mental prisons rather than in mental hospitals"', violates every standard
of due process of law. Clearly it is not "fair and just and proper," 5 nor does it
comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 6 As
one commentator has noted:
Denial of liberty and property without adequate treatment to restore these
rights to individuals is shocking to a sense of justice and fair play, and
persistent denial is violative of due process, because "confinement in a
mental hospital is as full and effective deprivation of personal liberty as
is confinement in jail."' 7
Judge Bazelon termed this practice of involuntary confinement without
treatment as "shocking."1 " In fact, it is submitted that this practice so shocks
the conscience as to be violative of due process under a logical extension of the
9 Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
369 U.S. 705 (1962); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hough
v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d
19, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See generally Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure
and Treatment: Medical Due Process, 15 DF PAuL L. REv. 291 (1965); Goldstein and Katz,
Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision To Release Persons
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale L.J. 225 (1960).
10 Ragsdale v. Overholser, supra note 9, at 947. See note 9 supra.
11 Goldstein and Katz, supra note 9, at 237.
12 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (concurring opinion).
13 Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 310. "[To hold a patient solely for potential dangerous-
ness would snap the thin line between detention for therapy and detention for retribution."
Goldstein and Katz, supra note 9, at 238.
14 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 504 (1960).
15 Ibid. ;The fair and just and proper test of due process was given by Frankfurter in
his dissent in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950), where he said, "Due process is
that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just."
16 A test of due process enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
17 Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 310, citing Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
18 Rouse v. Cameron, No. 19,863, D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1966, at 6.
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rationale in Rochin v. California.9 It has been suggested that in addition to
violating due process, such conduct may violate other constitutional guarantees
such as the equal protection clause' or that it may constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment.2
The right to treatment also has been recognized by statute in several other
jurisdictions.22 Even in the absence of statutes, it has been contended that the
state, as parefis patriae, has a duty to provide such treatment." Thus, it becomes
manifestly evident that persons involuntarily incarcerated after being acquitted
of a crime by reason of insanity have a right to adequate care and treatment.
Although few people, at least in the abstract, would dispute that those involun-
tarily confined after being adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity have a right
to adequate treatment, disagreement arises when it comes to implementing this
right with a positive judicial remedy.
The majority in Rouse found that the provisions in the 1964 Hospitaliza-
tion of the Mentally Ill Act requiring hospitals to keep records detailing psy-
chiatric care and treatment and to make such records available to the patient's
attorney indicated a congressional intent to implement the right to treatment
by affording a judicial remedy for its violation.2" If, however, the right were
placed on a constitutional ground, as has been shown it could well be, the deci-
sion to implement it would be entirely judicial. The recognition of a constitu-
tional right to treatment would seem necessarily to imply its implementation.
Many courts, though, when faced with the prospect of greatly increased mental
health appropriations necessary to provide adequate treatment and the possi-
bility that regardless of appropriations there might well be a national lack of
medical personnel,25 might shy away from the recognition of any such right or
of the remedy needed to enforce it. The right to treatment, which seems so
obvious in the abstract, has been ignored for a very long time, probably for
these reasons.2"
Indeed, it has been suggested that implementation of the right to treat-
ment through habeas corpus would result in the release of many persons danger-
ous to themselves and society.2" This in turn is expected to arouse such a public
19 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where conduct in combating crime that shocks the conscience
was found to violate due process of law.
20 Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964).
21 Ibid:
22 See CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 6621; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-344 (Supp.
1965); ILL. REY. STAT. ch. 913/2, §§ 12-2, 12-16, 100-7 (1966); IowA CODE ANN. § 225.15(1946); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1965);
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 86; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (1958); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (1953). See generally Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Prob-
lems of Law and Policy, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 945, 1002 (1959).
23 Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 302-303.
24 Rouse v. Cameron, No. 19,863, D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1966, at 7. D.C. Code § 21-562
(Supp. V, 1966), text of which is at note 5 supra.
25 While there are many statistics showing the inadequacy of our mental health programs,
one commentator noted that a recent survey disclosed:
[E]ighty percent of mental institutions are purely custodial, providing no treatment
of any significance even to their law-abiding patients for whom they are run. A
good proportion of the remaining twenty percent provide adequate treatment only
for well-paying private patients. Schmideber, The Promise of Psychiatry: Hopes
and Disillusionment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rv. 19, 22 (1962).
26 See generally Birnbaum, supra note 14.
27 Id. at 503.
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outcry that legislatures will be forced to increase appropriations and thus pro-
vide adequate care and treatment so that such persons can be constitutionally
detained until safe to release. 8
The right to treatment has two elements. The first is the initial decision
of the court that it will implement the individual's right to adequate treatment
by ordering him released if such treatment is not provided. As seen above,
however, recognizing the individual's right to adequate treatment will force
the legislative implementation of the right by providing treatment of all involun-
tarily committed mental defectives, with all the financial and personnel prob-
lems this will entail. In the past, many a court has shunned such policy decisions
where the potential.cost was so high, stating that such problems are exclusively
within the legislative domain. The Rouse majority, however, forthrightly faced
the problem. In effect, Rouse holds that the public must pay the cost of indi-
vidual rights and that mental prisons must be eliminated.
Once we accept the fact that there is a statutory or constitutional right to
adequate treatment, the remedy of habeas corpus would seem to follow imme-
diately. A person incarcerated solely because of his need of treatment, who
has a right to treatment but is being deprived of it, is "in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws" '29 of the United States and is entitled to relief in
habeas corpus. The court is required to "dispose of the matter as law and
justice require."3
Habeas corpus has been previously granted in a small number of cases that
came close to establishing a limited right to treatment. In In re Maddox,"1 a
petitioner, who had been adjudged a criminal sexual psychopath under the
Michigan Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, but who had never been tried or
convicted of any crime, was being incarcerated in a state prison rather than in
a mental hospital. Since he was not receiving treatment in an appropriate state
institution within the meaning of the act, his incarceration in a penal institution
was deemed unconstitutional in that he had never been convicted of a crime.2
In Commonwealth v. Page,3 the court sustained a petitioner's exceptions to a
commitment proceeding under a sex offender statute because the remedial aspect
of confinement as a sexually dangerous person must have a foundation in fact. 4
In this case, the defendant had been indefinitely committed to a prison treat-,
ment center which had not in fact been established. The court, in finding the
commitment invalid, stated that it is not sufficient that the legislature announces
a remedial purpose if the consequences to such a person are penal.2 5 "[A] con-
28 Ibid.
29 28 U.S:C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1964), dealing with power to grant writ of habeas corpus.
Rouse v. Cameron, No. 19,863, D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1966, at 13.
30 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964), dealing with hearing and decision on the writ of habeas
corpus. Rouse v. Cameron, supra note 29, at 13.
31 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
32 It is interesting to note'that if one accepts the statement that a mental hospital with-
out adequate treatment facilities is a mental prison, (see text accompanying note 14 supra)
its patients, who were committed after a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, are being
held in a penal institution without having been convicted of a crime.
33 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82. (1959).
34 The court stated that habeas corpus was the usual way to question such commitment
but that exception during the commitment proceedings was also proper. 339 Mass. 313, 159




finement in a prison which is undifferentiated from the incarceration of con-
victed criminals is not remedial so as to escape constitutional requirements of
due process." 6
The District of Columbia Circuit itself had once before granted habeas
corpus in a case in which there was an apparent lack of treatment. In Miller
v. Overholsery the petitioner alleged that his incarceration as a sexual psycho-
path in a place maintained for the confinement of violent, criminal, hopelessly
insane, instead of in a place designed and operated for mentally ill who are not
insane, was not authorized by the sexual psychopath act. The court agreed,
and went on to consider the availability of habeas corpus as a remedy. Although
recognizing that "except in circumstances so extreme as to transgress constitu-
tional prohibitions, the courts will not interfere with discipline or treatment in a
place of legal confinement,""8 it noted that "the writ [of habeas corpus] is avail-
able to test the validity not only of the fact of confinement but also of the place
of confinement." 9
The situation in Rouse fits both reasons enunciated in Miller. First, as
noted above, there may well be a constitutional right to treatment, the denial
of which would make the confinement invalid. Secondly, finding a right to
treatment would make incarceration in a place where there is no treatment,
incarceration in a place of invalid confinement, for which habeas corpus is a
remedy. It is apparent that Judge Bazelon was correct in directing the inquiry
into adequacy of treatment during a habeas corpus hearing. In so doing, he is
to be commended in his forthright implementation of a right often discussed
but never remedied.
Recognizing that the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding
mental disease has not reached finality of judgment, Judge Bazelon refused to
let lack of finality relieve the court of its duty to render an informed decision.'
While realizing that the "shortage of psychiatric personnel is a most serious
problem today,"'" he refused to justify our continuing failure to provide suitable
and adequate treatment because of the lack of staff and facilities." - He also
was aware that the shortage cannot be remedied immediately, but refused to
approve indefinite delay because "the rights here asserted are... present rights
.. .and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, they are to be
promptly fulfilled. 43
The majority opinion appears to leave the actual development of standards
for measuring the adequacy of treatment to the district court. It is clear, how-
ever, that treatment, to be adequate, need not be proven that it will cure or
improve the patient, but only that there is a "bona fide effort to do so."44 It
36 Ibid. Note that the statute involved in this case was one that provided for commitment
for an indefinite period without benefit of a jury trial.
37 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
38 Id. at 419. See Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1948); Platek v. Ader-
hold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 374-77.
39 Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In re Bonner, 151 U.S.
242 (1894). See White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1954).
40 Rouse v. Cameron, No. 19,863, D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1966, at 9-10.
41 Id. at 12.
42 Id. at 11.
43 Id. at 12-13, citing Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963).
44 Id. at 8.
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is also clear that if the district court finds that the patient is' not receiving ade-
quate treatment so that his incarceration violates the Constitution and laws of
the United States, it still may allow the hospital a reasonable opportunity to
initiate treatment depending on the length of time the patient has lacked treat-
ment, the length of time he has been in custody, the nature of his mental con-
dition, and the danger his release would present.4" The court may grant uncon-
ditional or conditional release if it appears the opportunity for treatment has
been exhausted or that treatment is otherwise inappropriate." Judge Bazelon,
however, refused to detail the possible range of circumstances where release
would be appropriate."'
Thus, we see that the right to treatment is recognized and the district court
required to look into its adequacy with the power to release the patient if the
hospital does not ultimately develop a program that does in fact treat. The
judges in the District Court of the District of Columbia are now burdened with
the job of determining when a patient is getting adequate treatment. Given
the flux which characterizes the field of psychiatry, and the fact that most judges
have little medical knowledge and so must depend on experts, this will be a
difficult task.
It is suggested that if the lower courts in the District of Columbia closely
adhere to Judge Bazelon's bona fide effort to treat test while making every effort
to avoid administrative decisions on medical practices, they will stay within
their habeas corpus powers and avoid becoming arbitrators of medical disputes.
Rouse's failure to guard against the danger of undue judicial interference in
the administrative-medical decision area is perhaps its greatest shortcoming.
The right of the involuntarily institutionalized to adequate psychiatric treat-
ment is undeniable. It is to be hoped that the right will soon be placed on a
sound constitutional basis by the Supreme Court. In the meantime, a cautious
implementation of the right through discretionary use of habeas corpus in the
District of Columbia can do much to pave the way for its ultimate nationwide
enforcement.
John E. Amerman
45 Id. at 13.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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